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The era of the classical gold standard, circa 1870-1914,  is rightly regarded as 
a high-water mark in the free movement of  capital, labor, and commodities 
among nations. After World War  I, the attempt to rebuild a world economy 
along pre- 19 14 lines was swallowed up in the Great Depression and in the new 
world war that the depression bred. Only in the 1990s has the world economy 
achieved a degree of economic integration that, in the assessment of Sachs and 
Warner (1995), rivals the coherence already attained a century earlier. This 
development broadly  fulfills the hopes for the world economy that United 
States policymakers held at the close of World War 11, albeit within an institu- 
tional and policy context far different from the one they designed or even envi- 
sioned. 
Why did the network of world trade suddenly collapse in the depression, 
and how did the collapse itself influence the subsequent process of regenera- 
tion? This chapter is primarily concerned with one aspect of international com- 
merce, capital movements, although the forces restraining international capital 
movements are not fully understandable without an appreciation of the natures 
and purposes of related restraints on other kinds of trade. 
In the present chapter we document empirically the ebb and flow of interna- 
tional capital mobility over more than a hundred years and propose a simple 
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framework for interpreting the forces that gave rise both to the disintegrative 
trend initiated by the depression and to the boom in global capital mobility of 
recent years. After first reviewing briefly the economic functions of  interna- 
tional capital movements, we review some empirical evidence. Our quantita- 
tive indicators-and  a wider literature-are  in broad agreement that interna- 
tional capital mobility was considerable during the days of the classichi gold 
standard and under the reconstituted gold standard through around 1930. They 
likewise agree that mobility contracted sharply as a result of  the depression 
and World War I1 and then slowly reemerged, albeit with significant reversals, 
starting in the late 1950s. 
With the quantitative history laid out for interpretation, we next chronicle 
the major vicissitudes of  the international capital market starting with World 
War I. Financial controls deployed in the course of  all-out war began to be 
relaxed later during an interregnum of floating exchange rates that was widely 
viewed as a prelude to the “normalcy” of  a restored gold standard. Nearly 
universal (again) by the end of  the 1920s, the gold standard was shattered by 
the Great Depression. Many countries utilized controls of  some sort in their 
attempts to maintain gold parities,  and  international finance became frag- 
mented as even free exchange countries struck bilateral deals with Germany 
and other exchange controllers. Controls spread and intensified during World 
War 11. Bilateral trade arrangements proliferated after the war in a scramble to 
husband scarce hard-currency-mostly  U.S. dollar-resources. 
The gradual restoration of convertibility in Europe (and elsewhere), fostered 
in part by American Marshall aid and the European Payments Union, promoted 
growing world trade and, with it, a growing risk of pressures on the pegged 
exchange rates mandated by  the postwar Bretton Woods system. The break- 
down of fixed dollar rates in the early 1970s led, in turn, to extensive liberaliza- 
tion of capital movements by the United States and Germany starting in 1974, 
by Japan starting in 1979, and by Britain in the same year. Most of Europe, and 
much of the developing world, followed suit starting around 1990. Evidently, 
individual country experiences have differed, as have the motivations for exter- 
nal liberalization and the institutional setting in which it has taken place. These 
differences notwithstanding, financial openness has now reached a depth, uni- 
versality, and resiliency comparable to that of the classical gold standard era. 
But that development was consummated only in the 1990s. 
Secular movements in the scope for international lending and borrowing 
may be understood, we shall argue, in terms of a fundamental macroeconomic 
policy trilemma that  all national policymakers face: the chosen macroeco- 
nomic policy regime can include at most two elements of the “inconsistent 
trinity” of (i) full freedom of cross-border capital movements, (ii) a fixed ex- 
change rate, and (iii) an independent monetary policy oriented toward domes- 
tic objectives. If  capital movements are prohibited (element i is ruled out), a 
country on a fixed exchange rate can break ranks with foreign interest rates 355  International Capital Mobility over the Long Run 
and thereby run an independent monetary policy. Similarly, a floating exchange 
rate (element ii is ruled out) reconciles freedom of international capital move- 
ments with monetary policy effectiveness (at least when some nominal domes- 
tic prices are sticky). But monetary policy is powerless to achieve domestic 
goals when the exchange rate is fixed and capital movements are free (element 
iii is ruled out), since intervention in support of the exchange parity then entails 
capital flows that exactly offset any monetary policy action threatening to alter 
domestic interest rates. 
Recognition of  the policy trilemma leads to a central proposition of  this 
paper. Capital mobility has prevailed and expanded under circumstances of 
widespread political support either for an exchange-rate-subordinated  mone- 
tary policy regime (e.g., the gold standard) or for a monetary regime geared 
mainly toward domestic objectives at the expense of  exchange rate stability 
(e.g., the recent float). The middle ground in which countries attempt simulta- 
neously to hit exchange rate targets and domestic policy goals has, almost as a 
logical consequence, entailed exchange controls or other harsh constraints on 
international transactions.' 
The Great Depression stands as a watershed in that it was caused by an ill- 
advised subordination of monetary policy to an exchange rate constraint (the 
gold standard), which led to a chaotic time of troubles in which countries ex- 
perimented, typically noncooperatively, with alternative modes of  addressing 
the fundamental policy trilemma. Interwar experience, in turn, discredited the 
gold standard and led to a new and fairly universal policy consensus, one that 
shaped the more cooperative postwar international economic order fashioned 
by  Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes but also implanted within 
that order the seeds of  its own eventual destruction a quarter-century later. The 
global financial nexus that since evolved is based on a solution to the basic 
open economy trilemma quite different than that envisioned by  Keynes or 
White-one  that allows considerable freedom for capital movements, gives 
the major currency areas freedom to pursue internal goals, but largely leaves 
their mutual exchange rates as the equilibrating residual. 
I. Our interpretation is consistent with the view in the political science literature that purposeful 
government control is the key factor determining the degree of international financial integration. 
See, e.g.,  Helleiner (1994) and Kapstein (1994), and the references they list. Also relevant to our 
analysis is the paper by Epstein and Schor (1992), who link the existence of controls to the balance 
of power  between  labor-oriented  interests  favoring  Keynesian  macroeconomic  policies  and 
financial-oriented interests favoring inflation containment. We stop short in this paper of a formal 
econometric analysis of the determinants of capital controls. Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-Ferretti 
(1994) and Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti  (1995) carry out panel studies of the incidence of  capital 
controls (for 20 industrial countries over the years 1950-89  and for 61 industrial and developing 
countries over the years 1966-89). Consistent with our interpretation, they find that more flexible 
exchange rate regimes and greater central bank independence lower the probability of capital con- 
trols. In chap. 12 in this volume, Bordo and Eichengreen discuss these results in greater detail and 
reconsider the effects of postwar capital controls on macroeconomic outcomes. 356  Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor 
11.1  Capital Mobility: Implications and Historical Evidence 
This section discusses the ramifications of  capital mobility in the interna- 
tional economy and reviews the current evidence we have as to the rise and 
fall of capital mobility over the long run. In subsection 11.1.1 we discuss the 
functional importance of capital mobility in historical perspective,  touching on 
issues of economic efficiency and the long-run convergence process. We  then 
document some basic evidence on the evolution of the global capital market, 
namely, the extent of capital flows as measured by countries’ balances on cur- 
rent account, equal to net foreign investment. This is followed by an examina- 
tion of the evolution of nominal interest differentials as a guide to the extent 
of market integration. After that, international differences in real domestic in- 
terest rates, taken as measures of the required return to capital, are looked at. 
Along the way  we  draw on related literature devoted to more sophisticated 
econometric tests of  market integration, but all evidence points to the latter 
part of the interwar period, the period of the Great Depression, as the era of 
weakest financial integration: capital flows were small, countries behaved like 
closed economies in the capital market, and real and nominal price (interest 
rate) differentials expanded. 
11.1.1  Functions of Capital Mobility 
We think it important to highlight the functions of capital mobility both for 
efficiency and for policy. The efficiency implications are clear enough: When 
capital is immobile, it may not be free to seek out the highest return within the 
global economy. Nor can countries smooth temporary fluctuations in consump- 
tion through international borrowing and lending or diversify risks through the 
exchange of assets with uncertain and imperfectly correlated payoffs. From the 
1930s investors had good reason to be cautious of committing funds to foreign 
countries that had (or might enact) forms of capital control, since returns would 
be compromised by  controls intended to tax or prevent the repatriation of 
profits. Cumulating over many years or decades, such disincentives could tend 
to produce a global misallocation of capital, with an inefficient and excessive 
amount of capital remaining in capital-abundant (rich) countries and too little 
flowing to  capital-scarce (poor) counties (Lucas  1990). Domestic  savings 
could be biased toward use in domestic investment activity (Feldstein and Ho- 
rioka  1980). These tendencies do indeed seem to be  characteristic of  much 
of the postwar period, as the evidence below suggests. The outcome was not 
discouraged by the tolerant and benign view of capital controls that prevailed 
for several decades in the aftermath of the Great Depression. 
Such a historical process would naturally have implications for the cross- 
country patterns of economic growth and development: To the extent that an 
excess of capital remained in capital-rich countries the process of convergence 
could have been retarded. Beyond just the evolution of productivity levels, such 
capital misallocation would have distributional implications. Inefficiently allo- 357  International Capital Mobility over the Long Run 
cated capital would be earning low  returns in capital-abundant locales, and 
capital-scarce areas would be characterized by  inefficiently low wages. Fur- 
thermore, the process of capital market integration would reinforce factor price 
equalization via trade and integration in goods markets (absent large-scale la- 
bor migration in the late twentieth century), a historical process deservedly 
attracting new attention (Wood 1994; Williamson 1996). 
Another potential function of an open capital market under conditions of 
high capital mobility is as a disciplining device on policymakers. Unsound 
policies may be limited by the threat of massive capital outflow. This form of 
commitment mechanism might be seen as supplementing, or possibly even 
dominating, any disciplinary power inherent in a commitment to an exchange 
rate peg. The full set of gold standard “rules of the game” has been character- 
ized as a form of commitment mechanism or reputational device because of 
the explicit constraints on monetary and fiscal policy (Bordo and Kydland 
1995; Bordo and Rockoff 1996). 
These advantages of  international capital mobility have all motivated its 
growth after periods of full or partial capital market collapse. As in the case of 
conventional commodity trade, however, the process of  market reintegration 
itself has required and reflected a political context enabling countries to over- 
come the coordination problems that often can obstruct the gains from trade. 
11.1.2  Trends in Current Accounts 
Following Eichengreen (1992b) and Taylor (1996b), we turn to some basic 
measures of the extent of capital flows throughout the past century. A sense of 
the changing patterns of international financial flows can be gleaned by exam- 
ining their trends and cycles. We focus on the size of the current account bal- 
ance CA as a fraction of national income l!  Thus, (CA/Y),  becomes the variable 
of  interest for country i in period t. By dint of the national income identity, the 
current account equals the difference between national saving S and domestic 
investment I, 
CA = S - 1. 
and thus corresponds to net foreign investment or, alternatively, to the level of 
net capital outflow. Thus, the size of the current account measures the extent 
to which the economy is borrowing abroad to finance its investment (CA  < 0) 
or is lending abroad to facilitate foreign investment in excess of foreign saving 
(CA > O).2 
2. Formally, we make definitions as follows. GNP is given by  Y = Q + rB = C + I + G + NX  + 
rB, where Q is GDP, C is private consumption, I  is investment, G is public consumption, NX is net 
exports, and r is the return on net foreign assets B.  The current account CA  satisfies CA  =  NX  + rB 
= (Y -  C -  G)  -  I = S -  I,  where S = Y -  C -  G is national saving. Finally, note that the dynamic 
structure of  the current account and the external credit position is given by the equality of the 
current account surplus (CA)  and the capital account deficit (-AX),  so that B,+, -  B, e  -KA,  = CA,. 358  Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor 
Table 1  1.1 and figure 1  1.1 present the basic trends in foreign capital 
To measure the extent of capital flows we use the mean absolute value pICm,, 
in each cross section at time t. Quinquennially averaged data are used in the 
figure, and in the table we present data for selected periods. By this measure, 
the average size of capital flows in our sample was often as high as 4-5  percent 
of national income before World War I.4 At its first peak it reached 5.1 percent 
in the overseas investment boom of the late 1880s. This dropped back to around 
3 percent in the depression of the 1890s. The figure approached 4 percent again 
during the years 1910-14,  and wartime lending pushed the figure over 5 per- 
cent in the years 1915-19. Flows diminished in size in the 1920s, however, and 
international capital flows were less than 1.5 percent of national income in the 
late 1930s.  Again, wartime loans raised the figure in the 1940s,  but in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the size of international capital flows in this sample reached an all- 
time low, around  1 percent of  national income. Only in the late  1970s and 
1980s have flows increased, though not to levels above those of a century ago. 
These basic descriptive data do illustrate the record of capital flows and offer 
prima facie evidence that the globalization of the capital market has been sub- 
ject to major dislocations, most notably over the interwar period, with a dra- 
matic contraction of flows seen during the depression of the 1930s. Moreover, 
this low level in the volume of flows persisted long into the postwar era. More 
sophisticated analysis of the quantity (flow) data is, of course, possible. The 
current account identity may be examined through a study of the relationship 
between domestic saving and investment, following Feldstein and Horioka 
(1980). Applying such techniques to 150 years of panel data as described above 
strengthens the basic impression that capital mobility reached its low point in 
the 1930s (Eichengreen 1992b; Obstfeld 1995; Taylor 1996b). 
11.1.3 
Perhaps the most unambiguous indicator of capital mobility is the relation- 
ship between interest rates on identical assets located in different financial cen- 
ters (see the discussion in Obstfeld 1995). Thus, for example, interest rates on 
Euromark deposits in London in recent years have been quite close to those on 
comparable deutsche mark deposits in Bonn. The great advantage of compar- 
ing onshore and offshore interest rates such as these is that relative rates of 
return are not affected by pure currency risk.s 
Evidence on Nominal Interest Rates 
3. The open circles in fig.  11.1 and in fig. 11.3 denote gaps in data coverage due to the two 
world wars. The positions of the circles are determined by the incomplete sample of countries for 
which data are available. 
4. In that era the main lender was Britain, whose current account surplus was often in the range 
of 5-10  percent of GDP (Edelstein 1982). 
5. Eichengreen (1991) presents similar data for the interwar period, as  does Marston (1995) for 
the postwar period. Under a fixed-rate regime such as the gold standard, another arbitrage-like test 
of financial market integration asks whether nominal interest differentials in different currencies 
are consistent with the maximal allowable exchange rate fluctuation band (Goschen  1861; Weill 
1903; Morgenstern  1959; Officer 1996). Such a test relies on the maintained hypothesis that the Table 11.1  Extent of Capital Flows since 1870 (mean absolute value of current account as a percentage of GDP) 
Period  ARG  AUS  CAN  DNK  FRA  DEU  ITA  JPN  NOR  SWE  GBR  USA  All 
~~ 
1870-89  18.7  8.2  7.0  I .9  2.4  1.7  1.2  0.6  1.6  3.2  4.6  0.7  3.7 
1890-1 9 13  6.2  4.1  7.0  2.9  1.3  1.5  1.8  2.4  4.2  2.3  4.6  1  .o  3.3 
1914-18  2.7  3.4  3.6  5.1  11.6  6.8  3.8  6.5  3.1  4.1  (5.1) 
19  19-26  4.9  4.2  2.5  1.2  2.8  2.4  4.2  2.1  4.9  2.0  2.7  1.7  3.1 
1927-3 1  3.7  5.9  2.7  0.7  1.4  2.0  1.5  0.6  2.0  1.8  1.9  0.7  2.1 
1932-39  1.6  I .7  2.6  0.8  1  .o  0.6  0.7  1.0  1.1  I .5  1.1  0.4  1.2 
1940-46  4.8  3.5  3.3  2.3  -  -  3.4  1.0  4.9  2.0  7.2  1.1  (3.2) 
1947-59  3.1  3.4  2.3  1.4  1.5  2.0  1.4  1.3  3.1  1.1  1.2  0.6  1.9 
1960-73  1.0  2.3  1.2  1.9  0.6  1  .O  2.1  1.0  2.4  0.7  0.8  0.5  1.3 
1974-89  1.9  3.6  I .7  3.2  0.8  2.1  1.3  1.8  5.2  1.5  1.5  1.4  2.2 
1989-96  2.0  4.5  4.0  1.8  0.7  2.7  1.6  2.1  2.9  2.0  2.6  1.2  2.3 
-  - 
Source: See Taylor (1996b). Some estimates revised. 
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Fig. 11.1  Extent of capital flows since 1870 (mean absolute value of current 
account, 12 countries, quinquennia, percentage of GDP) 
Source: See table 11.1. 
Nore: Open circles denote wartime samples. 
For much of  the period we  study in this paper, a direct onshore-offshore 
comparison is impossible. However, the existence of forward exchange instru- 
ments allows us  to construct roughly equivalent measures of  the return to 
currency-risk-free international arbitrage operations. Forward exchange trad- 
ing-in  which two parties contract to exchange currencies at a predetermined 
rate on an agreed date-is  one way to conduct international interest rate arbi- 
trage free of  currency risk. Using monthly data on forward exchange rates, 
spot rates, and nominal interest rates for  1921-96,  we assess the degree of 
international financial market integration by  calculating the return to covered 
interest arbitrage between financial centers. For example, a London resident 
could earn the gross sterling interest rate 1 +  i:  on a London loan of one pound 
sterling. Alternatively, he could invest the same currency unit in New York, 
simultaneously covering his exchange risk  by  selling dollars forward.  He 
would do this in three steps: Buy e,  dollars in the spot exchange market (where 
e, is the spot price of  sterling in dollar terms); next, invest the proceeds for a 
total of e,( 1 +  i,)  (where i, is the nominal dollar interest rate); and, finally, sell 
that sum of  dollars forward for e,( 1 + i,)&  in sterling (where A, the forward 
exchange rate, is the price of forward sterling in terms of forward dollars). The 
net gain from borrowing in London and investing in New York, 
exchange rate band is credible (though not on uncovered interest parity) and more recently has 
been interpreted as a test of exchange rate credibility (Svensson 1991; Giovannini 1993; Marston 
1995, chap. 5;  Hallwood, MacDonald, and Marsh 1996). 361  International Capital Mobility over the Long Run 
is zero when capital mobility is perfect and the interest rates and forward rate 
are free of default risk. 
We  can pursue a similar arbitrage calculation before 1920, but with minor 
modifications to correspond to historical practice and the prevailing financial 
instruments and institutions of  that earlier time. Forward exchange markets 
functioned before World War I (Einzig 1937, chap. 7), but they were compara- 
tively thin before the period of floating exchange rates that followed the war. 
For the period 1870-1920,  we consider a different type of sterling interest rate 
arbitrage operation between London and New York, the dominant market of 
its kind, going through the New York  market for 60-day sterling bills (for a 
discussion of this market, see Perkins  1978). Sixty-day sterling bills were 
promises to pay  the bearer one pound sterling, usually in London, after 60 
days. Thus, the dollar price of a sterling bill is the New York price of forward 
sterling in terms of current dollars. Rather than lending a pound in London at 
the gross interest rate prevailing there, one could instead buy e,  sight dollars 
and use these to purchase e,lb,  pounds payable in 60 days (where b, is the New 
York dollar price of a sterling bill). The net gain from borrowing in London to 
buy sterling bills in New York would be 
which again is zero under perfect integration of  the New  York  and London 
financial markets.6 
Table 11.2 and figure 1  I .2 present some evidence on covered interest arbi- 
trage on the dollar-sterling exchange since 1870, showing the above differen- 
tials for the years from 1870 to the present. Differential returns are calculated 
as annual rates of accrual. Some concerns about the data warrant mention.' 
First, as described above, the two measures of market integration that we calcu- 
6. This arbitrage argument underlies the calculation in the textbook by  Spalding (1915, chaps. 
5-6),  e.g., although he assumes perfect international financial integration. Notice that, unlike in 
the case of covered interest arhitrage, differential default risk between the New York and London 
markets is not important here. An implicit forward exchange rate based on the ''long''  exchange 
rate b, is given byf:"'p1""  = b,( 1 + i,). 
7. The data were collected from various sources. Exchange rates: Before 1921, spot and 60-day 
sterling bill exchange rates (in U.S. dollars) are from the Financial Review or Commercial and 
Financial  Chronicle;  1921-36  spot  and 90-day forward  rates  are from Einzig  (1937);  1937- 
November  1946 spot and 90-day forward rates are from the Economist; December  1946-May 
1947 spot and 30-day forward rates are from the Wall Street Journal; June 1947-1965  spot and 
90-day forward rates are from the New York Times; and thereafter, spot and 90-day forward rates 
are from OECD Historical Statistics and (starting in January 1976) from Reuters (as reported by 
Datastream). The Einzig foreign exchange data are monthly averages, whereas all other exchange 
rates are taken at or near the end of the month. Merest rates: For 1870-1920, three-month rates 
on London bank bills are from Capie and Webber (1985). data taken at or near end of month; 
1921-36,  month average data on London and New York three-month market discount rates are 
from Einzig (1937). U.K. interest rate data for 1937-April  1971 are three-month London bank bill 
rates from Capie and Webber (1985); May  1971-April  1991, three-month London bank bill rates 
are from Datastream;  and May  1991-April  1996, five-month London bank bill rates are from 362  Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor 
Table 11.2  Nominal Interest Parity since 1870 (U.S.-U.K. covered domestic 
interest differentials,  percent per annum) 





































Sources: See text. 
Notes: Monthly data; various maturities. Sixty-day bills before 1920; forward exchange after 1920. 
late refer to different arbitrage possibilities before and after 1920, and thus 
comparability across this break cannot be assured. Second, the forward and 
sterling bill transactions appear at different maturities in our data set: through 
1920 we deal with two-month rates, afterward with three-month rates. Third, 
most data are observed at or near the end of month, but all data for the years 
from 1921 to 1936 are averages of weekly numbers. Averaging has the effect 
of dampening measured volatility for part of the interwar period. Fourth, data 
from World War I1 reflect rigidly administered prices and have no capital mo- 
bility implications. Fifth, the data used are not closely aligned for time of day 
(and even differ as to day in some cases), so that some of the monthly devia- 
tions from nominal interest parity that we calculate may be spurious. Sixth and 
finally, this exercise is being performed here only for a single country pair, the 
United States and United Kingdom. In future work we hope to compile similar 
data for more countries, including France and Germany, to permit an evalua- 
tion of covered interest arbitrage between other markets. 
Despite these many caveats, the figures are revealing and supportive of the 
conventional wisdom. Differentials are relatively small and steady under the 
pre-1914 gold standard but start to open up during World War  I. They stay 
Datastream (all at or near end of month). For 1937-April  1940, rates on banker’s acceptances in 
New York are from the Ecunomist, at or near end of month; May 1940-May  1947, the same rates 
are monthly averages as reported by the Federal Reserve; June 1947-1965,30- to 90-day banker’s 
acceptance interest rates in New York come from the New York Times, observed at or near month’s 
end; January-April  1966, rates are month averages of 90-day banker’s acceptance rates reported 
by  the Federal Reserve; and starting in May  1966, the Federal Reserve reports month-end data, 
which we have used in the calculations. 363  International Capital Mobility over the Long Run 
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Fig. 11.2  Nominal interest parity since 1870 (U.S.4J.K. covered domestic 
interest differentials, annual, percent per annum) 
Source: See table 11.2. 
quite large in the early 1920~~  Differentials diminish briefly in the late 
but widen sharply in the early 1930s. There are some big arbitrage gaps in the 
late 1940s through the rnid-l950s, but these shrink starting in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, only to open up again in the late 1960s as sterling is devalued 
and as the Bretton Woods system unravels in the early 1970s. Interest differen- 
tials have become small once again only in the most recent years of  floating 
exchange rates. Thus, the Great Depression, perhaps as part of a much broader 
interwar phase of disintegration, stands out as an event that transformed the 
world capital market and left interest arbitrage differentials higher and more 
volatile than ever before. Disintegration lasted for several decades, and large 
nominal return differentials persisted into the 1980s. 
1990 
1920s 
1 1.1.4  Evidence on Real Interest Rates 
A basic standard for market integration remains the law of one price. This 
is usually interpreted for capital markets as implying some test for the equal- 
ization of  real costs of capital, typically real interest rates. It is well known, 
8. The rather stable premium on New York loans before World War I (which appears to fall in 
the early twentieth century) probably reflects a less liquid market. (The London reference rate is 
a high-quality bank bill rate.) For a comparative discussion of the New York and London capital 
markets before 1914, see Davis and Cull (1994, chap. 4). 364  Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor 
however, that real interest rate convergence is a very strong criterion for market 
integration, resting as it does not only on perfect capital mobility but also on 
two supplementary parity relationships, either of which may fail to hold and 
which are not directly relevant to capital mobility: uncovered interest parity 
(UIP) and purchasing power parity (PPP).’ 
Clearly, risk premia can modify UIP even in a world of free trade and fric- 
tionless asset markets, so UIP cannot be a relevant precondition for free capital 
mobility. As is well known, however, it is hard to devise reasonable models in 
which currency risk premia are large (Lewis 1996).  As for PPP, it may fail even 
over the long run because nontraded goods enter consumption price indexes. 
If capital is mobile and technologies ultimately converge internationally, how- 
ever, there will be a tendency for countries’ relative prices of nontradables in 
terms of  tradables to be equalized as time passes. The mechanism bringing 
about this equality is akin to that underlying the factor price equalization prop- 
osition in trade theory (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996, chap. 4).  It can work 
even without capital mobility, of  course, but is likely to be  speeded by  the 
technology transfer that international capital mobility may facilitate.’O Thus, 
even though PPP is sometimes asserted to be a proposition about goods market 
integration, capital mobility can indeed be relevant to the issue, hence to the 
international equality of expected real interest rates. Studies of long-run pat- 
terns of PPP may be very suggestive of the likely periods in which real interest 
parity holds or fails. Taylor (1996a) works with a 20-country panel data set and 
shows that the interwar period, and especially the 1930s, represents an era of 
marked deviation from PPP in the cross section. In contrast, the recent float 
shows evidence of a return to a level of conformity with PPP conditions not 
9. Uncovered (or “open”) interest parity requires  that the expected rate of relative currency 
depreciation over the relevant horizon equal the corresponding nominal interest rate difference 
between the two currencies: 
E,et+, - et  =  i,  - Q 
Here e, is now the log spot exchange rate (defined as the domestic currency price of foreign cur- 
rency) and  i, and  i:  are the home and foreign currency interest rates. Purchasing  power parity 
(strictly, the strong relative version of PPP) implies that expected exchange rate changes equal 
expected inflation differentials: 
EF,,, - e,  =  E?T+, - Err:, ’ 
where T,+,  =  p,,, -  p, and a:,  =  p;, -  p:  are the inflation rates in the two currencies based on log 
price levels p,  and p:.  UIP and PPP together imply the equalization of ex ante real interest rates: 
7  =  i,  - E,T,+,  =  i:  - E,T~;,  =  7* 
(Since UIP compares assets with  the same country/political risk characteristics,  which may be 
freely traded against each other, capital mobility comes in by ensuring that interest rates on a given 
currency are the same the world over, as discussed earlier.) 
10. Transport costs or regulations impeding the international shipment of rrudubles will, how- 
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seen since the classical gold  standard of  the late nineteenth century These 
findings beg the question whether real interest parities show similar patterns 
of historical evolution, as one might expect. 
The real interest parity relationship between prices in two physically sepa- 
rate, but economically integrated, markets could be tested in a number of ways. 
Prices may be equalized save for some transaction cost gap; or they may equal- 
ize in the long run but exhibit short-run deviations. Such concerns make the 
test of  strict and permanent equality only the most extreme or strict criterion 
for integration. If integration is not viewed as a zero-one variable, the degree 
of integration becomes a valid object of research. Exploring both the equili- 
brating forces of adjustment (promoting convergence in prices) and the nature 
of disequilibrating shocks to the system (promoting divergence), we may ask: 
How did the system perform in terms of the overall deviations from real inter- 
est rate equality that were actually recorded across time? The dispersion of the 
real interest rate is of  interest because it does indeed summarize two facets of 
the capital market: the size of market-specific shocks (impulses) and the capac- 
ity of the system to smooth out these shocks across space (propagation). The 
two together describe the stability and unity of the global capital market. Natu- 
rally, a system with uniform price shocks across regions will never be put to 
the test in terms of its adjustment capacity; and a system with good adjustment 
dynamics could cope with pronounced local disturbances and still dissipate the 
shocks so as to equalize rates of return quickly. 
The patterns of real interest rate dispersion offer preliminary evidence as to 
the working efficiency and stability of the world capital market, and the basic 
record for our sahple of countries is indicated by  table 11.3 and figure 11.3. 
Shown there is the standard deviation of real ex post interest rates for a sample 
of  10 countries from 1880 to 1989. Quinquennially averaged data are used in 
the figure, and in the table we present data for selected periods." 
The dispersion measure (the standard deviation) of real rates shows a defi- 
nite pattern. There was slight convergence in real interest rates after 1880 and 
before 1914, though nothing as dramatic as the convergence seen prior to 1870 
(cf. Lothian 1995). But after 1914, the dispersion of  real rates rose sharply. It 
fell slightly from the late 1920s to the early 1930s but then increased again. 
Dispersion hit a peak in the late 1940s, and then convergence in real interest 
rates was again seen during the early phase of Bretton Woods, such that, after 
1960, dispersion levels had returned to their pre- I914 levels. Dispersion has 
been flat almost ever since, with some divergence apparent upon the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. 
The dispersion data thus confirm again the textbook characterization of the 
11. The method echoes the recent study of Lothian (1995), and we find similar patterns here. 
Eichengreen (1991) compares and analyzes real interest differentials over subperiods of the in- 
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Table 11.3  Real Interest Parity since 1870 (dispersion of real interest rate, percent 
per annum) 
Average Absolute Differential Relative to USA  All 
Countries 
Period  AUS  BEL  CAN  FRA  DEU  ITA  NLD  SWE  GBR  S.D. 
1870-89  4.5  3.8  4.3  4.8  1.6  1.8  3.3  3.2  3.3  4.2 
1890-1913  2.8  4.1  2.1  4.2  2.4  1.8  2.8  2.6  1.8  3.4 
1914-1 8  7.9  -  1.3  -  0.7  11.0  5.8  8.3  6.2  (9.1) 
19 19-26  3.5  34.1  2.2  13.5  6.1  9.4  4.2  5.8  4.6  20.2 
1927-3  I  2.9  7.6  1.1  6.6  2.9  4.8  1.7  1.8  1.3  6.0 
1932-39  3.3  3.3  1.2  10.7  2.6  4.7  3.8  3.4  3.0  6.5 
1940-46  3.3  10.7  3.2  -  -  38.5  5.5  5.2  3.9  (22.3) 
1947-59  4.4  3.3  1.8  4.5  4.5  4.4  4.2  3.0  2.1  6.0 
1960-73  1.3  1.3  1.0  0.9  1.8  2.0  1.7  1.4  1.3  1.6 
1974-89  1.9  2.4  1.2  1.5  2.4  2.2  2.3  1.8  3.2  3.7 
1989-96  3.3  2.4  2.0  2.3  1.3  2.6  1.8  1.8  1.5  1.7 
Source: Unpublished data from Michael Bordo, with some series extended. 
Notes: Annual data. Parentheses denote average with some countries missing. 
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countries, quinquennia, percent per annum) 
Source: See table 11.3. 
Nore: Open circles denote wartime samples. 
Real interest parity since 1870 (dispersion  of real interest rate, 10 
evolution of international capital market integration. Integration was relatively 
high in the late nineteenth and late twentieth centuries-though  arguably no 
better now than under the gold standard-and  it was subject to a massive dislo- 
cation in the interwar period. Thus, together with the evidence on the extent of 
capital flows, this subsection again offers support for the view that the depres- 
sion marked a low point in the modern history of international  capital mobility. 367  International Capital Mobility over the Long Run 
11.2  World War I and the Interwar Period 
World War I demonstrated the capacity of  governments to radically alter 
exchange rates and price levels, often with the assistance of explicit controls 
beyond and above normal central bank operations. These newly found powers 
were not quickly forgotten. In the early  1920s, they were used to ease the 
deflationary adjustments of  economies  seeking to repeg to gold  and were 
abused in the monetary mayhem surrounding the hyperinflations in several 
European states. When the fleeting interwar gold exchange standard took form 
after 1925 the older laissez-faire approach to the exchanges was briefly reestab- 
lished as many countries eliminated or relaxed exchange controls, but the inter- 
national financial crisis of  1931 dealt a final blow to the old orthodoxy. Ster- 
ling’s departure from its gold peg in September 1931 heralded the demise of 
the gold-based system as well as the return of  exchange controls, “in many 
ways to an even greater extent than during and after the war” (Einzig 1934, 
1-2).  Out of the resulting economic and political turmoil would emerge the 
new consensus on international macroeconomic coexistence embodied in the 
Bretton Woods agreement of  1944. 
The effectiveness of exchange controls varied greatly. Naive policies con- 
tained loopholes through which regulations on capital flows might be evaded. 
Certain controls proved  hard  or even impossible to implement, but  others, 
when sufficiently refined by the increasingly cunning authorities, served their 
purpose. A measure of the impact of  such policies was the common appearance 
of the “black bourse” in some of the most tightly controlled economies. Free 
market rates often diverged widely from official rates. This added further un- 
certainty to foreign exchange markets already subject to frequent, often vio- 
lent, fundamental movements after floating rates appeared in the wake of gold 
standard suspensions during and after World War I. With the worlds nominal 
anchor removed, massive exchange risks reentered the calculation of every for- 
eign investor. Controls, if they threatened to compromise the secure and full 
repatriation of profits or principal, heightened risk further and could prompt 
capital flight or the collapse of  lending. Speculative activity in the forward 
market, and the emerging threat to central banks and treasuries posed by  in- 
creasing volumes of highly liquid, “hot” money, prompted even greater caution 
in the bureaucratic supervision of  foreign exchange transactions. Exchange 
controls thus compounded a deteriorating framework for international capital 
flows. 
11.2.1 
Direct controls over private exchange transactions were rarely employed un- 
der the gold standard before 1914. Central banks occasionally used “normal” 
measures to support exchange rates, broadly defined to include moral suasion 
over banks, direct interventions to alter gold export and import points, and 
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other formally noncoercive devices. But if a central bank could no longer de- 
fend the exchange rate through such measures, as often occurred in  Latin 
America, the rate was generally set free to float with no control employed. 
Within Europe, the credibility of exchange parities was bolstered by Britain’s 
hegemony within the world financial system and its espousal of free trade, as 
well as by  central bank cooperation and the overriding and largely unques- 
tioned commitment of  central banks to the goal of  gold convertibility at an 
unchanging par (Kindleberger 1986; Eichengreen 1992a). Credibility ensured 
that capital movements were usually stabilizing. The high degree of interna- 
tional capital mobility was promoted by the gold standard regime; and by re- 
ducing actual gold movements, capital mobility in its turn helped the system 
to function smoothly. 
The Great War destroyed this equilibrium, and the classical gold standard 
too. Initially, countries kept up the appearance of  the gold standard, main- 
taining official gold coinage, pegging official exchange rates, and, on paper, 
permitting the movement of  gold; but obstacles and regulations, as well as 
heightened susceptibility to patriotic appeals, prevented normal functioning 
according to the rules of the game (Eichengreen 1992a, 67). The belligerent 
countries were the first to enforce controls. Wartime needs drove their trade 
balances into deficit, and monetization of fiscal deficits drove inflation, though 
to widely differing degrees in the several countries.  Although exchange control 
became an “obvious necessity” in these circumstances, countries did not pro- 
duce a full-blown, cut-and-dried system of controls at the outbreak of war. A 
gradual implementation of ever stricter controls ensued, although trading with 
the enemy was quickly terminated. In 1914 and early 1915, belief that the war 
would be short and swift kept the exchanges fairly stable. It was not until later 
in  1915 that general foreign exchange transactions came under restriction as 
the exchanges became more volatile (Brown 1940,59-63; Einzig 1934,22-23; 
League of Nations 1938,9). 
Allied experiences varied considerably. The British began in  1915 by peg- 
ging the dollar rate of sterling, with the British Treasury acting via J. P.  Morgan 
in New York to support sterling at $4.7640 using gold and dollar reserves. In 
the early war years the country often came near to exhausting its reserves, as 
recounted by Keynes (1978, 10-12).  After 1917, it was the U.S. Treasury that 
supplied the required funds, and the peg continued. France employed similar 
methods to defend a franc-sterling  peg, albeit with both “passive” and “active” 
intervention by  the Bank of France. In the later stages of  the war exchange 
controls grew much stricter than in Britain. Whereas appeals to patriotism and 
other types of moral suasion had sufficed to discourage  outbound capital trans- 
fers for a while, in the end tougher measures were needed. France’s more se- 
vere inflation problems undermined the credibility of the peg, and capital out- 
flows were harder to tame. Italy likewise pursued a policy of pegging against 
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nonetheless resorted to exchange controls toward the end of the war. Even the 
United States applied direct controls after entering the war in 1917, despite its 
strong trade balance, as a result of  the dollar’s appreciation against several 
neutral currencies (Einzig 1934,28-29; Eichengreen 1992a, 73). 
In Germany, the mark was never pegged to another currency during the war, 
and the Reichsbank spent a mere 450 million marks on intervention to defend 
the mark in times when depreciation threatened to become a burden-a  tiny 
fraction of  the inter-Allied resources devoted to currency support. However, 
Germany’s trade was effectively blocked by the Allies, so its adverse net export 
balance was rather small. Exchange restrictions did not come into force until 
19  16 and were only mild until they were dramatically  reinforced in 19  17 (Ein- 
zig 1934,29-30). Still, Germany employed strong forms of compulsion to mo- 
bilize residents’ foreign securities (Eichengreen 1992a, 83). 
The Armistice gave hope that wartime exchange controls would soon be 
removed and the prewar state of  affairs would soon prevail. The removal of 
controls was one of the few things the Brussels Conference of the League of 
Nations (1920) could agree on (Eichengreen 1992a, 154-55).  In the United 
States exchange control was dismantled, and in  Britain controls had largely 
ended by the time sterling rejoined the gold standard in 1925. The dollar peg 
ended in March  1919, and sterling was cut loose to take care of  itself. The 
authorities refrained from direct control measures; however, occasional weak 
embargoes on British foreign loans were enforced starting in 1924 to bolster 
the currency as it inched back toward gold parity.I2  By floating in 1919, Britain 
was able to open its capital market relatively quickly after the war’s end. Else- 
where, however, stability proved elusive, and  exchange controls had  to be 
maintained or reinforced after the war as many countries descended into eco- 
nomic chaos (Einzig 1934, chaps. 4-5). 
When inter-Allied support ended, a rapid flight from the franc ensued with 
rampant bear speculation, and the Bank of France remained neutral and impas- 
sive, preferring to husband its gold stock rather than intervene in a probable 
losing cause. Harsh exchange controls were promulgated, but it was not until 
after the franc stabilized in 1926, and vast sums were repatriated, that all could 
see how  ineffective the controls had been. Moreover, other factors impinged 
on capital flows, notably the fierce controversy over the capital levy. With a 
broader franchise, political groups representing labor now tried to force capital 
to shoulder a larger part of  the fiscal burden. Deadlock persisted as govern- 
ments came and fell. In 1925, the capital levy was nearly adopted by the gov- 
ernment, a 10 percent tax on all wealth over 10 years, and although the govern- 
12. The  British government, for revenue reasons, also levied a stamp tax on foreign bearer 
bonds. See Moggridge (1971), who concludes, however, that British government suasion over for- 
eign lending was largely ineffective in keeping capital at home and that the  stamp tax could be 
evaded. His conclusion receives support from fig. 11.2, which shows that from 1924 through 1930, 
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ment fell on a no-confidence vote by the Senate, the capital levy idea was only 
killed for good by  the Poincark government’s fiscal stabilization package in 
late 1926. In the interim, the lingering possibility of a wealth tax sent capital 
fleeing abroad (Einzig 1934, chaps. 4-5; Eichengreen 1992a, 172-79). 
As  inflation seized Germany’s economy between  1919 and  1923, even 
tighter exchange restrictions were deployed to halt the slump in the mark. Ex- 
porters and importers had all exchange requests subjected to government ap- 
proval, and indirect controls were used to restrict imports. Even so, capital 
flight from Germany went on unabated, the black bourse in Cologne was very 
active, and the western border became a major point of  leakage. Exchange 
controls in  the successor states of  the Austro-Hungarian empire took even 
more esoteric  In Italy, the postwar Fascist regime enjoyed greater suc- 
cess in controlling the exchanges, however, largely as a result of its extraordi- 
nary powers of enforcement. 
In most countries, restrictions eventually were relaxed following stabiliza- 
tion. Still, there were delays; for example, although the mark stabilized in 
1923, the last restriction was not removed until 1926. And very often stabiliza- 
tion had only been achieved by dint of exchange controls in the interim. None- 
theless, by  1927, most of the world’s market economies had returned to “nor- 
malcy” in the form of pegged exchange rates and some form of gold standard. 
11.2.2  Interwar Exchange Control 
In sharp contrast with the laissez-faire approach normal during the classical 
gold standard era prior to 1914, the interwar period saw a marked increase in 
the adoption of policies to control not only international capital flows but for- 
eign exchange transactions in general (Einzig 1934; Gordon 1941). Controls 
over foreign currency transactions took several forms. In assessing how con- 
trols affect capital mobility, we are primarily concerned with measures that 
would have been viewed as “abnormal” under the gold standard-steps  taken 
to defend or change the course of the exchange, and covering direct measures 
such as loan embargoes and foreign exchange rationing and “indirect” mea- 
sures to influence the foreign trade or foreign loan markets. Such measures 
were attempted fitfully in the 1910s and 1920s, but their reappearance in “ex- 
treme forms” dated from the crisis of  1931 (Bratter 1939, 274).j4 
Such interventions  served a variety of purposes of concern to the policymak- 
ers: to counteract the transfer of liquid balances, the flight of national capital, 
the possibility of  speculation, fluctuations in the trade balance, or exchange 
13. It  was during a brief period in  1919 that Joseph A. Schumpeter served as Austrian finance 
minister. He favored a capital levy. 
14. In many ways the direct and indirect measures are interchangeable as policy instruments. 
Differential exchange rates according to type of good may yield the same relative price structure 
as  a  tariff  schedule. Barter  arrangements in  trade  resemble the  outcome of a  strict bilateral 
exchange-clearing  arrangement.  Thus, although direct measures impinge directly on foreign capital 
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controls of other countries. Controls could be called upon to offset mere day- 
to-day fluctuations or problems, to stem persistent speculation or capital flight, 
to smooth predictable seasonal and other normal tendencies, or to attempt to 
reverse fundamental trends. In many cases such attempts to distort capital ac- 
count transactions were also complemented by  commercial policies (tariffs 
and quotas) aimed at inhibiting the volume of  current account transactions. 
In fact, given the balance-of-payments identity, policymakers viewed certain 
exchange control and tariff policies as pure  substitute^.'^ From a macroeco- 
nomic viewpoint, controls enabled a government to maintain (at least nomi- 
nally) a pegged exchange rate, while simultaneously using interest rate policies 
and other policies based on divergences between internal and external prices 
to attain domestic economic objectives. 
Exchange controls became “among the best-hated” forms of  government 
interference in free markets in the eyes of observers and market participants 
(Einzig 1934, 106). Controls were criticized for causing exchanges to diverge 
from their fundamental levels (though identifying fundamental levels proved 
elusive in the interwar chaos) and for their damaging effect on international 
trade and finance (though the effect of  exchange controls here could not be 
easily differentiated from the corrosive effects of  tariffs, quotas, and other 
commercial policy choices). Even if not implicated on these charges, exchange 
controls were subject to even more stinging criticism, facing ridicule for being 
“utterly inefficient and impossible to enforce” (Einzig 1934, 107). The nettle- 
some interferences with the exchange were thus in vain, critics charged, on 
account of  weak policing and enforcement and the numerous loopholes that 
savvy exchange dealers could easily exploit to circumvent the intent of  the 
restriction. If the speculators proved strong enough for the task, the authorities 
faced certain defeat, and the incentive to exploit loopholes only loomed larger 
as the exchanges moved further from fundamentals, inviting arbitrage. Such 
was undoubtedly a major weakness of the early and rudimentary controls seen 
in the 1920s, as in the French and Belgian cases. Embargoes on loan issues 
might fail if  investors were willing to purchase issues in a third country or if 
short-term trade credits could be disguised and employed to finance longer 
term capital flows. Partial controls could be futile, as transactions might be 
easily disguised in false categories, necessitating full-blown supervision of ev- 
ery transaction (Nurkse 1944, 165). 
Evasion could never be totally eliminated, but authorities learned the lessons 
of failed controls and became more ruthless in imposing and enforcing trading 
restrictions as the 1930s wore on. All countries had access to a variety of mea- 
sures, beginning with  unofficial  discouragement of  capital export through 
15. Bratter again: “In effect control of the volume of foreign exchange transactions with foreign 
countries amounts to determination of the value or volume of goods and services exchanged with 
foreign countries. Exchange control accomplishes the purpose of a protective tariff or an import 
embargo. And it has the further ‘advantage’ that it often operates secretly as to the details” (1939, 
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moral suasion, official prohibition with the cooperation of the banks, or direct 
prohibition without the help of the banks. More desperate measures included 
even more restrictive allocations of exchange for loans and import, the compul- 
sory surrender of export proceeds, and, finally, the complete suspension of free 
dealings, that is, a crackdown on the black bourse.16 By the 1930s the criticism 
that the controls were ineffective could be said to have lost much of its force 
(Einzig 1934, 112). Capital controls were now binding on the global capital 
market to an unprecedented extent. Although devised primarily as a response 
to short-run problems with capital flight, even the prospect of modest barriers 
to outward flows undermined the efficient allocation of global capital. As Ellis 
succinctly summarized, capital controls “may interfere with the tendency of 
capital to bring its marginal employments to equality and thus maximize yields 
. . .  in preventing capital repayments, exchange control effectively discourages 
the investment of  new foreign capital. Since the ‘natural‘ direction of capital 
flow was toward the debtor (now exchange control) countries, this is probably 
the more serious consequence” (1941, 22). In addition, distributional conflicts 
over the tax burden raged on between labor and capital, and the possibility of 
a capital levy in some countries “hung over investors like a fiscal sword of 
Damocles, discouraging saving, provoking capital flight, and heightening the 
fiscal crisis” (Eichengreen 1992a, 107). Over the course of the 1930s,  external 
debt default became widespread in Europe and Latin America (Cardoso and 
Dornbusch 1989, 1394). All of these factors contributed to the dramatic fall in 
international capital mobility documented in the previous section. 
11.2.3  Controls as a Reaction to the Great Depression, 193  1-39 
The global Great Depression and the financial instability accompanying it 
were directly responsible for the sharp turn toward exchange control in much 
of the world. Stability on the exchanges came to an abrupt end in 1931, though 
trouble had been brewing longer in many countries, especially at the periphery 
(Einzig 1934, chap. 6; League of Nations 1938, 10-11;  Ellis 1941, 7; Yeager 
1976, chap. 17). Currency crises in 1931 led to flights from the Austrian schil- 
ling, the Hungarian pengo, and the German mark following the Creditanstalt 
collapse. It appeared that exchange control might be the only policy alternative 
since when “flight psychology” prevailed “no increase in the discount rate may 
be sufficient to deter it. Indeed an increase in the discount rate, by  shaking 
confidence further, is apt to produce the opposite effect”; yet, confoundingly, 
“the introduction of control itself. . . tended to upset confidence further, in- 
creasing the urge to export capital” making the exercise “self-aggravating to 
some extent” (Nurkse 1944, 162-63). Policymakers groped for a solution. 
In July 1931 a flight from sterling began, leading to gold standard suspen- 
16. Kindleberger (1984,392) notes the very desperate measures favored in fascist Germany and 
Italy, where punishments continuously increased in seventy until they included the death penalty 
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sion in September. Facing high unemployment, the British government had no 
stomach for an aggressive defense of the pound through budgetary retrench- 
ment, which would have required scaling back the dole. Nor did the Bank of 
England carry out an aggressive interest rate defense. Instead, bank rate was 
raised shortly before the announcement of the gold standard‘s suspension “as 
a measure of reassurance against inflation” (Sayers 1976,412). Soon the dollar 
and other currencies were exposed to runs, and flight from the yen drove Japan 
off gold before year’s end. Not all currencies fell from gold immediately, but 
the fear grew. In such circumstances, exchange controls inevitably returned 
to prominence: governments fought off depreciation and convertibility crises 
with intervention, exchange restrictions, and other forms of exchange control 
(Nurkse 1944, chap. 7). 
Simple intervention usually proved ineffective in the face of continued gold 
drain, as with Germany, Austria, and Hungary in the summer of  193  1. Coffee- 
house transactions on the black market soon undermined rationing through the 
banks. German restrictions were severe, foretelling the blocked balances and 
other obstructions to come. In July  1931  a partial transfer moratorium was 
announced, suspending principal payments and later extended in a full stand- 
still agreement with Germany’s creditors. Only thus was a collapse of the mark 
prevented. Both Austria and Germany’s banking systems stood on the verge of 
collapse, and choosing to sacrifice gold convertibility for bank stability, the 
governments adopted exchange control. 
In fall 1931 Britain promulgated several mild exchange restrictions follow- 
ing suspension and lasting for six months, primarily to prevent capital flight. 
In general during the 1930s, Britain employed relatively limited controls, rang- 
ing from persuasion, to an embargo on large foreign bond issues, to official 
restrictions applied by  banks that remained loyal to policy goals. But these 
measures were far from comprehen~ive.’~  The United States, under the Hoover 
administration, continued to maintain dollar convertibility into gold at $20.67 
per ounce. As an accompaniment to President Roosevelt’s suspension of  gold 
convertibility in  1933, however, the United States began to deploy informal 
pressures similar to those used in Britain, though occasionally enforcing offi- 
cial supervision of  banks when an assumption of  loyalty could not be taken 
for granted. 
In Japan, back on gold only since 1930 and suffering the fiscal strains of the 
Manchurian campaign, a gold embargo was applied to stem severe losses in 
1932; depreciation heralded the end of  convertibility and the application of 
more restrictions on foreign exchange to prevent capital flight. France also gen- 
erally avoided direct measures, relying on tariffs, quotas, and other commercial 
policies to keep the trade balance favorable and gold stocks plentiful-but  the 
17. Stewart noted: “There is, first of all, complete freedom of transferring pounds sterling into 
foreign currencies and, secondly, there are ample facilities for the purchase in London of foreign 
securities. The inconsistency of keeping these channels open while maintaining a strict embargo 
on new foreign issues has been severely criticised” (1938, 57). 374  Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor 
gold bloc could not hold on forever (Yeager 1976, chap. 18). Italy’s government 
made very effective use of unofficial restrictions by dint of the powerful com- 
mand of the banking system at central government level, and capital flight 
in  1935 forced Belgium into very stringent controls (Einzig 1934, chap. 6; 
Eichengreen 1992a, chap. 9).18 
The tendency toward the forcible confinement of foreign exchange within 
borders was perhaps most famously institutionalized in the widespread adop- 
tion of the system of “blocked balances” in Central European and Latin Ameri- 
can countries, and notably in Germany under the Gold Discount Bank (Einzig 
1934, chap.  12; Ellis  1941, 13-17).  Simply put,  “blocked currencies” en- 
shrined the idea that debtors could make debt payments not with foreign ex- 
change but with domestic currency placed in special, earmarked accounts, 
funds that the creditor might only then use in limited ways, for renewed direct 
investment in the debtor country or to buy more of the debtor’s exports. Thus, 
the blocked account became a new payoff option unilaterally imposed by debt- 
ors and effectively defaulting on the terms of their original loan  contract^.^^ 
Moreover, payment into a blocked account was often illusory as a financial 
transaction, entailing no shift in the structure of international indebtedness, 
affording no liquidity to the creditor, and usually enforcing no loss of liquidity 
on debtor banks that often maintained currency issues backed by  blocked ac- 
counts.20  Owing to this vehicle for credit creation, blocked accounts were eas- 
ily manipulated “for disguising the insolvency of the debtors, and especially of 
one particular debtor-the  Government of the debtor country” (Einzig 1934, 
126-27). Thus, an insolvent government might pay off debts into its blocked 
account then relend to itself out of the same funds. Inevitably, claims on such 
blocked accounts soon began trading on the secondary market at a heavy dis- 
count. An international market soon developed in the 1930s for four types of 
German marks, six types of Hungarian pengoes, and many other blocked cur- 
rencies. Market rates diverged dramatically from the official par rates of the 
exchange-controlled domestic currency.*’ 
Germany, Austria, and Hungary all developed complex systems of blocked 
currencies and bilateral clearings (Ellis 1941; League of Nations  1938, 16; 
Yeager 1976, 368-71).  Many other countries in Central and Southern Europe 
followed suit, causing the return of  virtual barter conditions in many goods 
markets and stifling foreign investment. However, the German case remains 
18. Italy’s controls were “so stringent as to render her gold bloc status meaningless” (Eichen- 
green 1992a, 357). The Belgian controls admitted loopholes and were rendered immaterial within 
weeks as speculators, anticipating a devaluation, provoked one (Eichengreen 1992a, 362-63). 
19. This payment was an option typically more injurious to the creditor than even a temporary 
moratorium-a  suspension that might only for a time prevent the discharge of debts but that did 
not inflict any change in the final terms of settlement. 
20. Put another way, the banks treated the accounts as reserves, rather than as earmarked funds 
not strictly available. 
21. Discounts were low for countries  whose exports were in demand but very high for currencies 
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the example par excellence of this type of  exchange control-and  by the late 
1930s it had persisted beyond the point where it was economically defensible, 
seeming more a tool of national and international political power via favorable 
allocations of trading activity to domestic agents and foreign trading partners. 
Thus, after the immediate 193  1 crisis, the reasons for keeping exchange control 
mutated, and the control “introduced in  the first instance mainly to prevent 
capital exports soon shifted its emphasis to the control of commodity imports” 
(Nurkse 1944, 166). Political as well as economic concerns surfaced, with the 
free market or black bourse as the only recourse for all but a few restricted 
transactions. “De  fucto and sub rosa devaluation transformed the official rate 
of exchange to a mere face-saving fiction” (Ellis 1941,293). 
In contrast to Germany, Austria long before the Anschluss was already re- 
laxing controls (Ellis 1941, chap. 2). Comparable measures to relax exchange 
controls and  bilateral constraints were to be  seen in Romania, Yugoslavia, 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and elsewhere in the exchange control 
bloc (League of Nations 1938,40-45).  Bilateral exchange clearing was begin- 
ning to be seen as a welfare-reducing, trade-diverting choice  justified by “ulte- 
rior ends”; one such end was protection, which “appeared as a by-product of 
attempting to defend the currency, but it proved to be so welcome a by-product 
as certainly to become an end itself” (Ellis 1941, 297). By obstructing trade 
along lines of comparative  advantage, clearings frequently depressed domestic 
exports, only exacerbating  the shortage of foreign exchange that exchange con- 
trols were supposed to alleviate. More and more countries turned away from 
trading under such constraints with countries in the clearing bloc (League of 
Nations 1938, 24-37;  Nurkse 1944, 177-83).22 
In Latin America, countries both depreciated their currencies and joined the 
movement toward exchange control as the depression deepened and after ster- 
ling left gold (Bratter 1939; Nurkse 1944, 162). Most also defaulted on their 
foreign debts, an event that had a profound negative impact on subsequent 
capital inflows to the region, as many defaults were not settled until the 1940s 
and even the 1950s (Diaz Alejandro 1983, 27). Controls were initially a re- 
sponse to balance-of-payments crises resulting from a collapse of  primary 
product prices and quanta in export markets, the stickiness of import demands, 
and large fixed nominal debt obligations. However, controls were generally 
less rigid than in Europe, with a liberal attitude taken to foreign exchange 
transactions outside normal channels-thus,  some capital account transactions 
were permitted and black markets were tolerated, while in Europe such flows 
were strictly controlled; and Latin American countries were generally less in- 
clined to adopt bilateral clearing arrangements save under duress (League of 
Nations 1938, 17; Nurkse 1944, 170). The key instrument was the rationing of 
22. Absurd examples of trade diversion included the import of raw materials in a bilateral clear- 
ing deal and subsequent reexport at a large loss to a free currency country, undercutting the original 
producer, simply as a means for the reexporter to  obtain foreign exchange (League of  Nations 
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exchange for different uses according to government priorities, implying multi- 
ple exchange rates (League of Nations 1938, 15). High priorities were usually 
debt service (unless in default) and essential imports.23  The more “reactive” 
countries soon adopted controls: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Colom- 
bia  (in  1931); followed by  Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and  Uruguay 
(1932); Ecuador (1933); Honduras (1934); and Venezuela (  1936).24  Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, and Colombia were locked in clearing agreements with Ger- 
many, and these plus Costa Rica and Uruguay controlled trade along bilateral 
lines via exchange controls or clearing agreements. Such arrangements had 
marked consequences for regional trade, and a good deal of Latin American 
trade was canalized bilaterally not by  choice but by  the actions of European 
trading partners and to the detriment of  rival markets. In  many  countries, 
trading  with  Nazi  Germany  under  special  internationally  nontransferable 
commodity-specific marks was seen to have dramatically altered the composi- 
tion of trade.*’ Although the Pan American Union called for moves to abolish 
controls in 1936, the 1937 recession again exposed the underlying weakness 
of  the periphery’s balance-of-payments position, and no concrete action was 
taken to lift controls before the war (Bratter 1939, 286). 
Australia was  also  typical of  peripheral primary producers caught in  a 
balance-of-payments crisis and facing unsustainable capital outflows as early 
as 1929. The terms of trade had dived from a peak in 1924, reflecting oversup- 
ply in the wool market. Mild controls appeared first in the form of foreign 
exchange rationing, and soon the currency slipped outside the gold points. It 
was 8 percent off par by April 1930. A steady devaluation ensued, and a black 
market appeared, compromising the policy of rationing via the banks. Eventu- 
ally the system broke down, and the currency was devalued to 30 percent be- 
23. The discovery that such policies could radically alter the shape of foreign trade and the level 
of domestic economic activity eventually allowed new and broader purposes of economic control 
to motivate the use of exchange control, beyond the presumably temporary intent to manage transi- 
tory payments crises. It was partly thus that “reactive” policies of the 1930s paved the way  for a 
transition to import substitution strategies in the 1940s and 1950s. See Fishlow (1971) and Diaz 
Alejandro (1984). 
24. Of these, only Venezuela permitted  a completely “free” parallel market; other countries 
intervened to greater or lesser extents. More “passive” countries such as Cuba, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, and Peru did not institute any 
controls in the 1930s (Bratter 1939, 280-81). 
The methods of exchange control varied. E.g., in Argentina, the government still favored alloca- 
tion of foreign exchange to balance bilateral trade, much to U.S. consternation, and largely as a 
result of the 1933  Roca-Runciman Treaty with Britain-itself  a deal struck to offset British impe- 
rial trade preferences established in the Ottawa Treaty (Bratter 1939,279-81;  Salera 1941). A much 
stricter regime of controls held sway in Uruguay-four  varieties of exchange rate were subject to 
manipulation, bilateral clearing arrangements were even more constraining, and attempts to favor 
particular products and trading partners more pervasive (Bratter 1939,281-82). 
25. Between  1929 and 1937, the British shares of imports fell in Brazil (19.2 percent to 12.1 
percent), Chile (17.7 percent to 10.9 percent), and Peru (15.0 percent to 10.3 percent), while Ger- 
man import shares to all three rose (Brazil,  12.7 percent to 23.9 percent; Chile,  15.5 percent to 
26.1 percent; and Peru, 10.0 percent to 19.7 percent; all figures from Bratter 1939, 284). 377  International Capital Mobility over the Long Run 
low par at the start of  193  1. Canada followed similar steps to limit gold export 
and convertibility, inevitably leading to devaluation of its currency (Eichen- 
green 1992a, 232-36,240). 
11.2.4  Policy Outcomes 
Once the initial crisis of  193  1 passed, policymakers faced a choice: on the 
one hand they could treat exchange controls as a temporary expedient for the 
crisis and thereafter work toward free exchanges, sacrificing policy autonomy; 
or else they could retain and enhance the security of their controls and so ex- 
pand the range of policy options. Thus, by the mid-l930s, countries could be 
classified as “free currency” countries (whether on or off the gold standard) or 
“exchange control” countries (League of  Nations 1938; Eichengreen 1992a, 
339). (Of course, even countries in the former group could employ informal 
measures of  capital account control, such as moral suasion, in the interest of 
exchange rate or balance-of-payments targets.) Table 11.4 illustrates some of 
the contrasts between the exchange rate experiences of the two groups. The 
free  currency  group  included  much  of  Scandinavia and  Western  Europe. 
Among these, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and France (along with 
the United States until 1933) were in the “gold bloc” and avoided devaluation 
only through strong indirect measures (e.g., tariffs and quotas) in the early 
1930s. By  contrast, exchange control economies included Germany, Austria, 
Hungary, and neighboring countries to the east, plus Turkey, Italy, and the Bal- 
tic states-a  largely Central and southeastern European grouping. In the latter 
group, generally severe exchange controls allowed governments the freedom 
to maintain parities (or tolerate only relatively mild devaluations) without fear 
of speculative attacks, as capital flight was severely contained.z6 
Recent academic writing has emphasized the role of the international gold 
standard in propagating the Great Depression, showing systematically how 
countries that maintained gold parities and continued approximately to follow 
other gold standard rules of  the game through the mid-1930s suffered much 
sharper output declines and deflati~n.~’  Countries willing  to devalue could 
26. Equivalently, Eichengreen  (1992a. 258) uses a three-category classification consisting of 
“exchange controlled,” ‘‘sterling  area,” and “gold  bloc”-in  practice,  those  not on controls or 
pegged  to gold chose a sterling peg,  with a few exceptions (e.g., Canada, which pegged  to a 
sterling-dollar basket). After 1935 the gold bloc collapsed. France, Switzerland, and the Nether- 
lands departed from their earlier policies, but without control. Some exchange control countries 
did choose to devalue-e.g.,  Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Greece-and  some no longer adhered to 
official rates of exchange. The conclusion of the Tripartite Agreement between Britain, France, and 
the United States lent a modicum of stability and a veneer of cooperation to international monetary 
arrangements,  and conditions improved until  the recession  of  1937 (League of  Nations  1938; 
Eichengreen 1992a). 
27. See, e.g., Choudhri  and Kochin (1980), Diaz Alejandro (1983), Eichengreen  and Sachs 
(1985), Hamilton (1988). Temin (1989), Campa (1990), Eichengreen (1992a), Bernanke (1995), 
and Bernanke and Carey (1996). These writers have followed on a nonformal tradition that quite 
clearly appreciated the basic monetary forces at work in propagating and prolonging the depression 378  Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor 
Table 11.4  Currency Depreciation in the 1930s (percentage depreciation relative 
to official gold panty) 
Country  1932  1935 






























Free currency countries (gold bloc) 
Free currency countries (devaluers) 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  1.7 
1.7  1.9 
1.5  6.3 
0.0  16.2 
22.0  22.0 
6.8  23.0 
0.0  39.9 
29.7  51.5 
54.5  53.9 
39.4  54.3 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  3.2 
0.0  0.0 
28.0  40.2 
2.1  40.8 
0.0  40.8 
11.9  40.9 
25.2  41.9 
25.9  45.6 
26.9  47.0 
36.4  50.4 
34.2  52.3 
42.5  52.6 
Source: League of Nations (1938,50-5 1). 
“Annual average. 
bMonthly average for March 1932 or 1935. 
but that lacked a rigorous analytical and statistical framework for representing their global scope. 
Thus, Edward M.  Bernstein, Harry Dexter White’s deputy at the U.S. Treasury during the Bretton 
Woods negotiations and the first research director of the International Monetary Fund, recalled in 
1984 that “we [at the Treasury] held that the Great Depression was caused by the interaction of the 
wartime inflation and the traditional gold standard.. . . The Great Depression did not end until 
every country had abandoned the gold parity of its currency” (Black 1991,98). See also Haberler’s 
(1976) evaluation. Eichengreen (1992a) cites Ralph Hawtrey and Lionel Robbins as early precur- 
sors. Unfortunately, the insular focus of  much American macroeconomic thinking for at least 35 
years after World War I1 tended to blind many U.S. scholars to the powerful international monetary 
transmission mechanism at work during the depression. 379  International Capital Mobility over the Long Run 
lower the relative price of national output and expand their money supplies, 
boosting effective demand and employment while retaining a relatively open 
capital market. Exchange control countries addressed the macropolicy tri- 
lemma by  eliminating capital movements. While officially maintaining 193  1 
gold parities, these countries effectively devalued their currencies through a 
maze of  restrictions on foreign exchange acquisition. Elimination of  depen- 
dence on international capital markets in some cases increased the scope for 
domestic fiscal expansion, as in Germany. But countries in the gold bloc, de- 
spite resort to conventional trade policies, felt the full force of the policy tri- 
lemma, maintaining initial gold parities and free foreign exchange markets 
only at the cost of a deep and protracted domestic slump. 
Econometric evidence points to independent roles for controls and exchange 
depreciation in mitigating the effects of the depression. The equation below is 
a 26-country cross-sectional regression of  the  1929-35  cumulative rate of 
growth of  industrial production, AIP,  on a constant and two dummy vari- 
ables. FIXED takes the value one for countries that held their official exchange 
rates fixed at  1929 levels longer than the United States (which severed the 
dollar’s link to gold in April 1933) and takes the value zero for others. CON- 
TROLS equals one for countries classified by  the League of  Nations in the 
mid-1930s as exchange control countries and is zero for free exchange coun- 
tries. (The exchange control group comprises a wide variety of control strate- 
gies, some much more stringent than others, and omits countries that applied 
controls only fleetingly.) The result of estimation (with standard errors in pa- 
rentheses) is 
AIP  = 0.028 - 0.261 FIXED + 0.213 CONTROLS,  R2 = 0.41. 
(0.060)  (0.080)  (0.079) 
As is now well known, countries that retained fixed exchange rates suffered 
harsher real contractions. According to the preceding equation, they experi- 
enced (on average) over the years 1929-35 a 26 percent output decline avoided 
by countries that devalued. However, controls (which usually implied de facto 
devaluation) had a significant mitigating effect on the extent of output decline 
due to fixed exchange rates.28 
The output effects of controls are mirrored by the behavior of the price level, 
28. The exchange control countries in the sample are Argentina, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Den- 
mark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, and Romania. The free exchange 
countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland (which imposed controls only in 1936). Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,  the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. (Some countries, such as Argentina, Austria, and Denmark, both devalued 
early and imposed controls.) Wholesale price index data come from League of  Nations, World 
Production and Prices, I937/38. Industrial production data come from the same source, except for 
Argentina, Australia, and Switzerland,  the data for which are used in Bernanke and Carey (1996) 
and were generously provided by Ben Bernanke. 380  Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor 
as shown in the following regression, in which the dependent variable is the 
cumulative 1929-35  rate of wholesale price index (WPI) inflation: 
AWPI  = -  0.157 - 0.227 FIXED + 0.082 CONTROLS,  R2 = 0.66. 
(0.026)  (0.035)  (0.034) 
Here we see again the familiar deflationary effect of fixed exchange rates, but 
also a significant countereffect of  controls on the price level. Though statisti- 
cally significant, that effect is small because the “devaluation” implied by con- 
trols did not generally lead to significant monetary expansion relative to the 
world average. 
Fundamentally, these diverse experiences underscored the unattainable na- 
ture of the economic “trinity”: of three desirable policy goals, exchange rate 
stability, full employment, and free capital mobility, only two of three are mu- 
tually compatible. The free currency devaluers discarded exchange stability 
and gained the freedom to pursue expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. 
The exchange control countries sought the same freedom by inhibiting capital 
mobility and, further, manipulated the levers of thoroughgoing exchange con- 
trol and discriminatory trading in pursuit of domestic goals. Notably, neither 
group considered a full return to gold standard orthodoxy,  requiring the neglect 
of the full-employment goal and commitment to the other two goals, exchange 
parity and free exchanges-a  testament to the transformation in the political 
economy of macroeconomic management, the power of new interest groups 
and enfranchised voters, and the resulting unwillingness of  governments to 
tolerate deflation and labor unrest in a distributional fight under conditions of 
downward wage inflexibility (Eichengreen 1992a). 
Much of the motivation for maintaining pegged exchange rates, both in gold 
bloc and exchange control countries, was the fear of  hyperinflation and the 
attendant social conflict, as witnessed all too recently in Central and Eastern 
Europe. That fear was present, though not dominant, even in  countries that 
chose open devaluation (see Eichengreen 1992a, 292; Nurkse 1944, 166; Say- 
ers 1976, 412). Ironically, exchange control, itself so inimical to the liberal 
principles of orthodox finance, nonetheless facilitated the persistence of ortho- 
dox monetary policies in those countries least willing, given recent inflationary 
experience, to sacrifice the nominal anchor of their official gold parity. Even 
in peripheral Latin America, “memories of wild inflation under inconvertible 
paper during the late nineteenth century, memories still fresh during 1929-3 1, 
The coefficient on CONTROLS in the last regression implies that, on average in the sample, 
imposing exchange controls nearly offset the negative output effect of not devaluing. This result 
appears at odds with the conclusion in Eichengreen (1992a. 350, table 12.1, col. [4]) that exchange 
control countries did better than gold bloc countries but much worse than devaluers. However, the 
exchange control group underlying the last regression is larger than Eichengreen’s, including, in 
addition to his observations, Argentina, Japan, Romania, Greece, Latvia, Estonia, and Denmark. 381  International Capital Mobility over the Long Run 
hampered and slowed down the adoption of more self-assured and expansion- 
ist policies” (Diaz Alejandro 1983, 18). 
The exchange control countries, burdened by  foreign debts and precarious 
reserve levels when the 193  1 crisis hit, could maintain their exchange parities 
in no other way but through controls. Once in place, however, controls were in 
most cases difficult to contain and were found to have  other uses (albeit at 
foreigners’ expense). The gold bloc countries, in contrast, had the financial 
resources to cling to gold parities without radical controls but as a result were 
defenseless against the deflationary forces of the depression. As much as any- 
thing, the experience of these countries discredited the last adherents of gold 
standard orthodoxy and opened the way for the new and interventionist Keyne- 
sian approach to international monetary relations that would prevail after the 
Second World War. 
11.3  World War 11, Its Aftermath, and the Resurgence of 
Capital Mobility 
Private international capital mobility reached a nadir during and after World 
War  11,  with much of the world left in the grip of bilateral payments arrange- 
ments. The postwar international economic order negotiated at Bretton Woods 
in 1944, and inaugurated with the declaration of currency par values in 1946, 
mandated convertibility for current account but not necessarily for capital ac- 
count transactions. Even current account convertibility proved hard to attain, 
however, in the circumstances following the war. Only at the end of  1958 was 
external (Le., nonresident) convertibility on current account restored for the 
main European c~rrencies.~~  The following decade was characterized by  in- 
creasing capital mobility, but also by speculative tensions that prompted indus- 
trial countries to intensify capital controls in an attempt to shore up the system 
of  fixed exchange rates. These measures proved insufficient, and the modern 
era of floating dollar exchange rates finally dawned in 1973. Since then, the 
international flow of capital has expanded dramatically. 
11.3.1 
The onset of renewed war in 1939 led to an intensification of exchange con- 
trol. In  a memorandum written for British Treasury officials in  September 
1939, Keynes recalled of the emergency measures taken during World War I, 
“Complete control was so much against the spirit of  the age, that I doubt it 
Wartime Intensification of Exchange Control 
29. A currency is externally convertible if foreigners who hold it (but not necessarily residents 
of the issuing country) may exchange it freely for other currencies or for domestic goods and assets. 
The currency is externally convertible for current transactions if foreigners who have acquired it 
through exports or receipts of  asset income can convert it into other currencies or domestic goods. 
(In contrast, a currency is internally convertible when domestic residents may freely exchange it for 
other currencies.) For a discussion of various notions of convertibility, see McKinnon (1979,3-7). 382  Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor 
ever occurred to any of us that it was possible” (Keynes 1978, 10). Countries 
drew heavily on their interwar experiences with controls to mobilize their for- 
eign exchange resources for all-out conflict. By March 1940, dealings in nearly 
all the world‘s  major currencies, the two important exceptions being the U.S. 
dollar and the Swiss franc, were subject to some form of exchange control 
(Mikesell 1954, 15).  An additional advantage of restricting capital outflows in 
wartime was that governments might thereby borrow at artificially low rates 
of interest. 
Britain introduced controls in August and September 1939, initially regulat- 
ing residents’ purchases of foreign currencies but neither blocking sterling bal- 
ances held by nonenemy aliens nor preventing all sterling transactions between 
residents and nonresidents. An offshore market in “free” sterling consequently 
developed. As Keynes forcefully pointed out, nonresidents could buy British 
exports with free sterling, thus depriving the country of badly needed hard 
currency-basically,  U.S. dollars or Swiss francs (1978, 158-71).  This loop- 
hole and others were closed early in June 1940 (Mikesell 1954, 16), the same 
month Keynes took up a formal advisory position at the Treasury.30  The in- 
terwar sterling bloc, previously a loose association of countries pegging to the 
pound, narrowed its membership and transformed itself into the Sterling Area, 
within which similar external exchange controls were enforced but internal 
currency transactions, including capital movements, were free.31 
11.3.2  Capital Mobility in the Bretton Woods System 
Well before the end of the war,  officials in Allied treasuries were turning 
their minds toward designing a postwar international economic order. In 1941 
and  1942, respectively, John Maynard Keynes in Britain and Harry Dexter 
White in the United States circulated different draft plans for postwar institu- 
tions designed to aid in the maintenance of exchange stability, macroeconomic 
stability, and orderly, generally nondiscriminatory trading relations among na- 
tions. White’s  plan would, in  1944, become the basis for the Bretton Woods 
agreement that led to establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
Both plans are instructive, however, for the light they throw on official and 
academic attitudes toward the role of  capital movements.32  In  essence, the 
plans reflected a broad policy consensus, growing out of the experience of the 
depression, that the global economy would not necessarily be smoothly self- 
30. In August, Keynes was placed on the Exchange Control Conference. 
31. The Sterling Area’s holdings of  hard currencies were centralized at the Bank of England, 
which also supplied these resources when needed by area members. Both internally and outside of 
the Sterling Area, sterling was inconvertible into hard currencies or gold. 
32. Various drafts of  the Keynes and White plans are reproduced in Horsefield (1969). The 
French and the Canadians also advanced proposals (the latter was known colloquially as the “off- 
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regulating were wartime controls to be dismantled, so that exchange rates and 
international capital movements would both have to be closely ~ontrolled.~~ 
Keynes’s plan stepped back from the extreme economic nationalism he had 
flirted with in his famous 1933 article on “National Self-Sufficiency” (Keynes 
1982, 233-46).34  But the plan’s basic premise was that heavy government man- 
agement of macroeconomic policies and exchange rates should be deployed in 
the defense of  internal macroeconomic stability and that such a resolution of 
the policy trilemma presupposed extensive restrictions over not only capital 
movements but foreign exchange transactions in general. 
Keynes’s plan proposed an International Clearing Union (ICU) that would 
facilitate multilateral trade among members and extend credit (within limits) to 
cover current account deficits. To these ends, countries with external surpluses 
would accumulate claims on the ICU, and countries with deficits, liabilities. 
Such credits of “bancor,” as the new international currency was called, fixed in 
gold value and in terms of national currencies, would be used by countries to 
settle international accounts, much as gold had been in an earlier era. The insta- 
bility associated with fluctuating interwar exchange rates remained a powerful 
influence over attitudes toward postwar monetary relations. In Keynes’s view, 
floating rates were to be rejected both for their disruptive effects and as a rever- 
sion to discredited laissez-faire economics. 
Exchange values under the ICU were not to be “unalterably” fixed, however; 
far from it. Instead, Keynes’s conception, as expressed several years later in 
defending the proposed IMF in the House of Lords, was that “we are deter- 
mined that, in future, the external value of sterling shall conform to its internal 
value as set by our own domestic policies. . . .  Instead of maintaining the prin- 
ciple that the internal value of  a national currency should conform to a pre- 
scribed de jure external value, [the Bretton Woods plan] provides that its exter- 
nal  value  should be  altered if  necessary to  conform to whatever de fact0 
internal value results from domestic policies, which themselves shall be im- 
mune from criticism by  the Fund” (Keynes 1980b, 16-18).  In other words, 
exchange realignments rather than domestic deflation, as under the gold stan- 
dard, were the preferred tool for rectifying payments deficits and unemploy- 
ment in Keynes’s system. Domestic policies would be geared toward high em- 
ployment, with short-term international imbalances being met by overdrafts on 
the ICU. Keynes’s view on exchange rate adjustment represented a sea change 
in the attitudes that had prevailed in the gold standard era. As Haberler puts it 
33. There were, of course, numerous dissenters from various aspects of this consensus, e.g., 
Friedman (1953), who argued for floating exchanges and freedom of short-term capital movements, 
and Viner (1943b), who espoused fixed rates but  believed they might be consistent with a liberal 
capital transfer regime. Some still argued for the gold standard (New  York Times, 30 March 1943). 
34. Harrod (1951,525-26) ascribes the shift to Keynes’s perception in  1941 that in a new post- 
war order, Keynesian economics might be applied on a global scale, rather than the national scale 
he envisaged in the 1930s. 384  Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor 
in an insightful discussion of the Great Depression’s causes and legacy: “The 
sanctity of fixed exchange rates was a casualty of  the Great Depression. It is 
true that there had been many exchange-rate changes in the nineteenth century 
and earlier. But the devaluation of the leading currencies of the world . . .  made 
the operation ‘salonfuhig,’ that is, fit for gentlemen” (1976, 17). 
Keynes appreciated clearly that by resolving the policy trilemma in favor of 
internal employment goals and exchange rate management, he was ruling out 
open  capital  markets.  Indeed,  Keynes’s  plan  embraced  exchange  control 
wholeheartedly and explicitly called for curbs on capital movements, with 
some provision for international long-term capital movements added in as an 
afterth~ught.~~  The attitude toward private capital movement was set out explic- 
itly in all drafts of Keynes’s plan, for example, the 
It is widely held that control of  capital movements, both inward and out- 
ward, should be a permanent feature of the post-war system-at  least so far 
as we &e concerned. If  control is to be effective, it probably involves the 
machinery of exchange control for all transactions, even though a general 
‘open license is given to all remittances in respect of current trade. But such 
control will be more difficult to work, especially in the absence of postal 
censorship, by unilateral action than if  movements of  capital can be con- 
trolled at both ends. It would therefore be of great advantage if the United 
States and all other members of the Currency Union would adopt machinery 
similar to that which we have now gone a long way  towards perfecting in 
this country; though this cannot be regarded as essential  to the proposed 
Union. (Horsefield 1969, 13) 
White’s alternative plan placed less emphasis on periodic exchange rate ad- 
justment than did Keynes’s and viewed capital movements in a somewhat more 
favorable light. Dam (1982, 83) quotes a passage from the April 1942 version 
of  the White plan (Horsefield 1969, 47) to support the assertion that White 
took a creditor’s view of the postwar order, favoring reduced capital controls 
in contrast with “Keynes’s enthusiasm for capital controls.” In fact, White was 
referring to generalized exchange controls on the model of interwar Germany 
in the quoted passage, not specifically to capital controls, and later in the plan 
advocated a prohibition of  IMF resources for funding “illegitimate” capital 
flows (Horsefield 1969, 49-50).  Such a provision would have been necessary 
in any event to assuage congressional fears that the United States would end 
up funding unlimited foreign imbalances. White’s plan also called for interna- 
tional cooperation to limit capital flows inspired by “speculation” or tax eva- 
sion: “It would be an important step in the direction of  world stability if  a 
35. In  Keynes’s conception, central banks  would be monopoly  dealers in  foreign exchange 
within each country; they in turn would sell foreign exchange to the ICU for bancor credits or settle 
directly with foreign central banks. As monopoly dealers, the central banks were ideally placed to 
scrutinize  all foreign exchange transactions  and deny foreign  exchange for purposes of  capital 
transfer (Keynes 1980a, 216). 
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member government could obtain the full cooperation of other member gov- 
ernments in the control of capital flows. . . . The assumption that capital serves 
a country best by flowing to countries which offer most attractive terms is valid 
only under circumstances that are not always present. . . .  A good case could 
be made for the thesis that a government should have the power to control the 
influx and efflux of capital, just as it has the authority to control the inflow and 
outflow of goods and of gold’ (Horsefield 1969,66-67). 
In reality, Keynes and White were not far apart on the principle that capital 
flows might need to be regulated, although Keynes’s methods for accomplish- 
ing this task were more realistic and therefore much more dirigiste. This shared 
tolerant attitude toward capital account prohibitions was fully reflected in the 
eventual Articles of Agreement establishing the IME A major goal of the IMF 
system was nondiscriminatory multilateral convertibility on current account 
(as set out in Article VIII). But Article VI(3) stated that “members may exercise 
such controls as are necessary to regulate international capital movements.” 
Article VI(  1) prohibited members from using IMF resources “to meet a large 
or sustained outflow of capital” and even empowered the Fund to request im- 
position of capital controls in such cases (Horsefield 1969, 193-94).  Keynes’s 
plan had also included the latter feat~re.~’ 
The United States’ agreement to such provisions in  1944 and  1945 may 
seem contrary to  its  natural interests as  the premier creditor and financial 
power of  the postwar period. As noted above, however, Congress was con- 
cerned about the extent of America’s financial commitment. The allowed re- 
strictions, anyway,  seemed unlikely ever to be  needed by  the United States, 
would likely apply to other countries’ outflows rather than inflows, and could 
only ensure New York‘s position as the worlds leading financial center. Busi- 
ness interests in the United States were in any case more concerned with cur- 
rent account convertibility and expanded export opportunities than with capi- 
tal flows. 
Moreover, New Deal Washington viewed the financial world with consider- 
able distrust. This distrust was inherent in the Democratic Party’s Jacksonian 
tradition. But it was greatly heightened by  the perceived role of  banks and 
security markets in bringing on the Great Depression. Disillusion with banks 
and financial markets prevailed in many countries, in fact, and led to a general 
reduction during the 1930s of central bank independence in favor of treasury 
dominance. (See Dam  1982, 53. On the United States, see Calomiris and 
Wheelock, chap. 1 in this volume.) This view provoked stricter regulations on 
financial markets in the 1930s. It is also reflected in Treasury Secretary Henry 
Morgenthau’s  pronouncement  at  Bretton  Woods  that  the  new  institutions 
would “drive . . . the usurious money lenders from the temple of international 
37. In  1956 the IMFs executive directors interpreted Article VI as allowing countries (subject 
to some mild restrictions) to impose capital controls “for any reason” and “without approval of the 
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finance” (Gardner 1980, xix), and in his successor, Fred Vinson’s, unilateral 
shift of IMF and World Bank headquarters from New York to Washington on 
the purported grounds that  “the institutions would be fatally prejudiced in 
American opinion if  they were placed in New  York,  since they would then 
come under the taint of  ‘international finance”’ (Keynes 1980a, 211). White 
himself undoubtedly shared these views, arguing in his plan that capital con- 
trols “would constitute another restriction on the property rights of the 5 or 10 
percent of persons in foreign countries who have enough wealth or income to 
keep or invest some of it abroad, but a restriction that presumably would be 
exercised in the interests of  the people-at  least so far as the government is 
competent to judge that interest” (Horsefield 1969, 67).38 
11.3.3  Postwar Inconvertibility and the European Payments Union 
At the height of  the world war in  1943, the governments-in-exile of  the 
Belgium-Luxembourg union and the Netherlands entered into a bilateral fi- 
nancial agreement that was the first of  about 200 that would be in effect in 
Europe by  1947 and nearly 400 that would be in effect worldwide shortly 
thereafter (Yeager 1976,407). Under the agreement, the two countries prom- 
ised to peg their mutual exchange rate by standing ready to purchase the other’s 
currency. This type of  agreement aimed at conserving reserves of  hard cur- 
rency and gold through mutual credit arrangements but in practice entailed 
controls over resident transactions so as to prevent the buildup of unbalanced 
positions in partner currencies. A corollary of hard-currency scarcity was  a 
continuation of  currency inconvertibility and of  wartime prohibitions on pri- 
vate capital movements, which might quickly strip a government of reserves. 
Domestic financial controls further limited international intermediation and, 
along with the economic and political instabilities implied by reconstruction, 
blocked  the  channels  through  which  potential  capital-receiving  countries 
might have borrowed privately abroad. Private international capital movements 
had essentially dried up. 
Currency inconvertibility seriously compromised even the gains from cur- 
rent international trade. If  country A had a trade surplus with country B, it 
could not use its surplus accumulation of B’s currency to finance a deficit with 
country C,  as would have been possible under general external currency con- 
vertibility. Somehow, country A’s  payments would have to be balanced vis-a- 
vis both B and C individually, not simply vis-a-vis the rest of the world taken 
in totality. Bilateral trading agreements may  have been superior to blanket, 
indiscriminate limitations on foreign transactions in allowing for mutual cred- 
its (the trade creation aspect), but they had the drawback of shunting demand 
from the cheapest source of supply worldwide toward countries with extensive 
demands for domestic products (trade diversion). A  system of  multilateral 
clearing held out the potential of easing such constraints and promoting more 
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efficient global resource allocation, if only a true multilateral payments system 
could be attained. 
Unfortunately, universal convertibility, even limited external convertibility, 
was difficult for individual countries to attain in the immediate postwar cir- 
cumstances. Restoring convertibility required countries to solve a serious coor- 
dination problem. In  a  setting of  general inconvertibility, a single country 
allowing foreigners to freely convert its currency would face an uncomfortable 
net drain of  foreign exchange reserves: foreign exporters would convert the 
bulk of  their domestic currency earnings into central bank foreign reserves, 
whereas most of the foreign currency earned by domestic exporters would be 
unusable. The latter could insist on being paid in their own currency, but this 
would seriously injure sales, as the home country would likely have its best 
potential export markets in countries from which it did not itself import much. 
Furthermore, foreign countries might deliberately restrict imports from the 
convertible currency country so as to maximize their hard-currency inflow at 
its expense.39  Of course, one solution to the problem would have been for mon- 
etary authorities simply to refrain from trading domestic currency for foreign 
currencies, that is, to let the exchange rate of domestic currency float, as several 
countries did after World War I. Indeed, Friedman’s celebrated polemic “The 
Case for Flexible Exchange Rates,” drafted in 1950, explicitly promoted float- 
ing rates as a strategy for moving immediately to general currency convertibil- 
ity (Friedman 1953, 158). This step governments were reluctant to take, out 
of fear of the currency instability and hyperinflation associated with interwar 
floating exchange rates. 
Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement, as noted earlier, called for 
convertibility on current account and unrestricted freedom of current interna- 
tional payments. Article XIV, however, allowed countries to maintain restric- 
tions contravening Article VIII during a transitional period, and even to intro- 
duce new  restrictions. Only five years after the start of  IMF operations was 
any member not yet in compliance with Article VIII required to begin annual 
consultations on its progress with the Fund. 
At  the time the articles were drafted, a five-year breathing space was re- 
garded as allowing a reasonable period for the general return to (current ac- 
count) convertibility. Nothing of the sort happened. Instead, controls generally 
proliferated. By  1953, more countries were engaging in  multiple currency 
practices than in 1946, leading Mikesell to the exasperated remark that “the 
system of fixed exchange parities combined with a complex of neo-Schachtian 
devices has provided far less exchange stability in the postwar period than did 
the fluctuating free exchange rates of the 1930s” (1954,25-27).  By 1957, only 
eight countries apart from the United States and Canada-Mexico,  Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Haiti, and Panama- 
39. See Yeager (1976, 409-10)  for further discussion of  this “contagion of  bilateralism.” See 
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had  formally accepted the Article VIII obligations (Triffin 1957, 115). The 
proliferation of controls reflected the same forces preventing unilateral move- 
ments toward convertibility by dollar-hungry countries. A classic example is 
Switzerland,  which, to protect foreign exchange reserves, made its franc incon- 
vertible for Europeans while leaving it convertible for residents of the dollar 
area (see Kaplan and Schleiminger 1989,57; Yeager 1976,409). 
Some countries responded to the situation by  adopting floating exchange 
rates, IMF norms notwithstanding. Canada dismantled its exchange controls 
under cover of a floating rate; Mexico, Peru, and Chile likewise floated their 
currencies; and Churchill’s government in Britain seriously debated a scheme 
for freeing the pound in 1952 (Cairncross 1985, chap. 9; Kaplan and Schlei- 
minger 1989, chap. 10). 
Triffin argued that the IMF might have been able to move the world more 
quickly to convertibility if its structure had facilitated multilateral clearing, for 
example, through Keynes’s conception of  a synthetic international currency. 
Instead, the Ih4F blueprint “dealt with the setting up and revision of par values, 
the elimination of exchange controls, and the Fund’s lending operations as if 
these problems could be handled with each country individually against a 
background of general convertibility and stability in world trade and currency 
arrangements” (Triffin 1957, 137).  The coordination problem involved in mov- 
ing to the latter type of equilibrium from the one left by the war was not ad- 
dressed. 
The hazards of a unilateral return to convertibility by war-tom countries are 
well illustrated by Britain’s abortive attempt to restore multilateral current ac- 
count convertibility for sterling in July 1947-an  experiment that had to be 
abandoned after only five weeks. In September 1945 a British delegation led 
by  Keynes arrived in Washington to negotiate a loan of  dollar reserves. The 
United States insisted (among other conditions) that sterling’s convertibility on 
current account be restored no later than one year after the funds (totaling 
$3.75 billion) became available. Congress and American business interests 
strongly supported the convertibility provision (as well as an associated trade 
nondiscrimination clause; see Gardner  1980, 197-98).  In  particular, these 
groups felt that the LMF articles’ timetable for restoring convertibility was lax. 
Immediate convertibility of so widely held a currency as sterling, it was be- 
lieved, would hasten worldwide freedom of current payments, at the same time 
easing discriminatory trade practices intended to maximize bilateral trade sur- 
pluses with the United States. 
Britain put aside its misgivings and agreed to these terms: 15 July  1947 
emerged as sterling’s convertibility date after congressional approval of the 
loan midway through 1946.4O Britain’s current account deficit increased sharply 
after the harsh winter of  1946-47.  By the end of June more than half the U.S. 
loan had been used up (Cairncross 1985, 132). Despite continuing gold and 
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dollar outflows, however, Britain fulfilled its commitment and declared con- 
vertibility on 15 July, hoping desperately that convertibility would raise global 
confidence in sterling. Instead, reserve outflows accelerated. With only $400 
million of the American loan remaining, Britain suspended convertibility on 
20 August. 
The sharp acceleration in dollar losses in July seems largely to have been 
the result of capital outflows. It was feared that convertibility would be fleeting 
and that sterling might be devalued once the experiment failed. Now was the 
time to get dollars, and at a relatively cheap sterling price. (Convertibility did 
turn out to be very temporary, but the feared devaluation did not come until 
1949.) The result was a classic speculative attack. How was an attack on ster- 
ling carried out in a world of seemingly pervasive capital controls? Some coun- 
tries converted preexisting sterling balances into dollars, representing them as 
current earnings. On the basis of revised balance-of-payments data, Cairncross 
(1985, 157) argues that this channel was not very important, notwithstanding 
a long tradition placing much of the blame for the debacle on such conversions 
(e.g., Gardner 1980, 317-18).  More significant were “leads and lags” in trade 
credits-the  practice of  accelerating sterling payments and delaying foreign 
currency receipts in the expectation of a sterling depreciation (Einzig 1968). 
Finally, some reserves leaked out through capital transfers to other Sterling 
Area countries. Sterling Area members such as South Africa and Australia bor- 
rowed large sums of sterling in London and rapidly used the proceeds for im- 
ports from the dollar area.41 
The crisis carried two distinct lessons. First, in the circumstances of  the 
immediate postwar years, a single country like Britain with a structural current 
account deficit due to wartime changes could not unilaterally return to convert- 
ibility. Any such return would need to be coordinated among many nations. As 
Gardner puts it: “The fact is that the negotiators [of the Anglo-American loan 
agreement] did not fully understand the economics of convertibility. They did 
not appreciate the difficulty in which Britain might find itself in the event that 
it went on accumulating inconvertible currencies while other countries, delib- 
erately restricting imports from the United Kingdom, presented large sterling 
surpluses for conversion. Given this hazard of making one currency convertible 
in a generally inconvertible world, the use of a rigid time-table was certainly 
injudicious” (1980, 218). 
A second lesson of the crisis, one less appreciated at the time, was that dam- 
aging speculative crises could occur even under exchange control. Capital con- 
trols were porous, certainly porous enough to devastate the slim liquidity bases 
upon which most countries were operating in the late 1940s. The channels of 
capital flight revealed in the U.K. convertibility crisis, especially leads and 
lags, would remain widely operative through the end of the Bretton Woods 
system, coming strongly into play whenever the prospect of  devaluation of- 
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fered a large speculative gain over a short period. Indeed, the scope for such 
phenomena only increased as trade expanded in the 1960s. 
Even  before  Britain  suspended  sterling’s  short-lived  convertibility,  the 
United States proposed the Marshall Plan with its accompanying call for eco- 
nomic cooperation within Europe. The plan reflected a change in the U.S. “uni- 
versalist” approach to postwar economic problems, motivated by  the percep- 
tion  of  a  dire  political  threat  to  a  uniquely  important  region.  American 
policymakers had  hoped  that  Marshall aid  would  promote intra-European 
trade, strengthening Europe’s economies and creating a shared interest in polit- 
ical stability. However, the absence of  any multilateral clearing system for 
intra-European payments frustrated this hope. Under prodding from the U.S. 
European Cooperation Administration, which had been set up to administer 
the Marshall funds, the nations of Western Europe in September 1950 created 
the European Payments Union (EPU). The EPU was a major success in facili- 
tating trade liberalization within Europe (and extending it to territories on other 
continents that belonged to some European country’s currency area). The EPU 
worked by every month consolidating each member’s bilateral payments defi- 
cits into a net debt to the union, extending some credit but eventually requiring 
settlement in dollars and gold. This arrangement allowed European country A 
to use its surplus with European country B to finance its deficit with European 
country C, despite the inconvertibility of B’s currency. (The IMF, in contrast, 
could perform no comparable clearinghouse function.)42 
The initial success of  the EPU allowed some privatization of  foreign ex- 
change transactions, which  had been  concentrated in  the hands of  central 
banks. This liberalization allowed private banks to take over some of the EPU’s 
clearing functions. Over the course of the 1950s several EPU members, nota- 
bly the United Kingdom and Germany, liberalized foreign exchange transac- 
tions further, Germany going much the furthest in allowing residents to retain 
foreign exchange earnings and to hold foreign assets. (In the United Kingdom, 
residents could deal among themselves in a managed pool of foreign “invest- 
ment currency” but otherwise were barred from acquiring foreign assets, while 
nonresidents until 1967 had to trade sterling securities in a separate market 
for “security sterling.”) During 1957-58  Europe’s hard-currency reserves rose 
sharply, the counterpart of  a huge U.S. payments deficit. On 27 December 
1958, the EPU was terminated by mutual consent, with most members, includ- 
ing France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, declaring their currencies 
externally convertible on current account. (The former EPU countries formally 
accepted their Article VIII convertibility obligations in February 1961. Japan 
followed in April 1964.) Germany also moved to full convertibility on capital 
account, so that, as of January 1959 the Bundesbank could declare that “only 
the payment of interest on foreigners’ balances, the sale of domestic money- 
42. For  discussions of  the EPU,  see Triffin (1957), Kaplan  and  Schleiminger (19891, and 
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market paper to foreigners and the taking of  foreign loans running less than 
five years remain forbidden, the object being  to check  the inflow  of  ‘hot 
money’ into the Federal Republic” (Deutsche Bundesbank 1959, 52). 
Germany’s motives for such wide-ranging liberalization were two. One was 
the free market ideology characteristic of  Economics Minister Ludwig Er- 
hard’s  policies. Equally important, however, was the pressure on Germany’s 
internal liquidity and prices due to the chronic balance-of-payments surplus 
that had developed after the early 1950s. By liberalizing capital outflows, the 
authorities hoped to reduce the payments surplus, whereas the remaining capi- 
tal controls listed in the preceding quotation were intended to discourage capi- 
tal inflows and provide scope for sterilization  operation^.^^ 
In 1957 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands 
signed the  Treaty  of  Rome  creating  the  European  Economic Community 
(EEC). The treaty called on signatories to undertake the progressive abolition 
“between themselves of all restrictions on the movement of capital belonging 
to persons resident in Member States” (Article 67( l),  quoted in Bakker 1996, 
279). This provision was viewed as fundamental to the long-term goal of  a 
single European market. In its first directive of May  1960, the EEC Council 
required member countries to free short to medium-term trade credits, direct 
investments, and cross-border trades of listed shares. 
Germany had pushed for full liberalization of capital movements in the ne- 
gotiations leading to the directive, including movements between EEC mem- 
bers and nonmember states (Bakker 1996,81). In May 1959, seeing a welcome 
fall in its official reserves and assuming that the policy of encouraging capital 
exports was working, Germany unilaterally abolished its remaining restrictions 
on capital import (Yeager 1976, 496). Despite policymikers’ optimism, how- 
ever, Germany was very shortly to experience the type of policy conflict that 
ultimately brought the Bretton Woods system down amid escalating capital 
controls. 
11.3.4  The Collapse of Bretton Woods 
Only the month after the EEC Council’s directive on liberalization of capital 
movements, Germany reimposed some of the controls it had abolished a year 
earlier, hoping to discourage renewed capital inflows. Attempting to restrain 
a domestic boom through higher interest rates, the Bundesbank found itself 
frustrated by the large volume of reserve purchases it was obliged to carry out 
43. On Germany’s attempts to counteract the inflationary potential of its balance-of-payments 
surpluses, see Boarman  (1964) and  Emminger (1977). Germany’s relatively fast  productivity 
growth in the 1950s and 1960s mandated a secular real appreciation of the deutsche mark against 
the dollar, that is, a rise in Germany’s price level measured in dollars against that of  the United 
States. Given a fixed nominal exchange rate, however, this equilibrating real currency appreciation 
could occur only through higher inflation in Germany than in America-something  German poli- 
cymakers were largely unwilling to accept. This tension made revaluation inevitable once German 
capital markets were fully open. In contrast, Japan did accept a higher inflation rate than that of 
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to maintain the deutsche mark’s exchange parity. In March  1961, Germany, 
soon followed by the Netherlands, reluctantly revalued its currency by 5 per- 
cent against the dollar. 
These events heralded a new era in which speculative capital flows continu- 
ally bedeviled policymakers in Europe and elsewhere. Concerted EEC prog- 
ress on further capital account liberalization  bogged down, and fear of specula- 
tion made any open discussion of  exchange parity changes impossible. Italy 
suffered a balance-of-payments crisis in 1964, which it beat back with the help 
of loans from the United States and the IMF. Britain entered a prolonged pe- 
riod of crisis in the same year, giving in finally and devaluing sterling in No- 
vember 1967. Nonetheless, individual European countries did take some liber- 
alizing steps in the early and  mid-1960s. Italy allowed its residents more 
freedom to invest abroad. France, enjoying a strong balance of payments dur- 
ing the mid-l960s, unilaterally eased its controls in 1967, motivated in part by 
a desire to promote the role of Paris as a global financial center (Bakker 1996, 
101). However, the May  1968 disturbances sparked capital flight and a reim- 
position of French controls; at the same time Germany, the recipient of much 
of the flight capital, tightened its own barriers to capital inflows. Speculation 
continued into 1969:  France resisted until the speculation  temporarily subsided, 
then surprised markets by devaluing in August. Speculation  on a German reval- 
uation reemerged in the same year in advance of parliamentary elections. Just 
prior to the election, the government closed the official foreign exchange mar- 
ket, then allowed the deutschemark to float. The new government of Chancellor 
Willy Brandt revalued the currency by just over 9 percent at the end of October. 
How could capital flows continue to undermine authorities’ efforts to defend 
exchange parities even in the face of tightened capital controls? Leads and lags 
in trade credits again provided an important conduit for speculative capital 
flows; indeed, Einzig (1968) characterized leads and lags as “the main cause 
of devaluation” in his book on the subject, although his broad definition of the 
phenomenon included changes in the timing of  goods orders (not just pay- 
ments) as well as forward currency trades. The growth of international trade 
after the early 1950s-in  itself a prime desideratum of the Bretton Woods ar- 
chitects-ironically  expanded the opportunities for disguised capital flows. 
The reopening of private foreign exchange markets and the emergence of the 
Eurocurrency markets in London in the 1960s further widened the scope for 
leakages from protected domestic financial systems. The growing tendency to 
delay realignments until the market forced the authorities’ hands, itself a result 
of  increasing possibilities for speculation, ensured that a speculative attack 
might produce very large profits over a very brief period. Thus, even modest 
elasticities of trade credits, say, with respect to normal interest differentials, 
could translate into large flows of reserves in crisis episodes. 
The United States meanwhile had been facing its own problems since the 
end of the period of “dollar shortage” in the late 1950s. Growing U.S. balance- 
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a growing stock of short-term official dollar claims on the United States. Some 
of  these claims were converted into gold, putting pressure on the American 
gold stock, but the bulk were held despite mounting anxiety that the dollar’s 
gold content might suddenly be reduced. In response, the United States took a 
number of measures to counter private capital outflows. Starting in 1961, an 
escalating sequence of  dividend and interest taxes, voluntary guidelines, and 
mandatory limits were imposed on American capital outflows abroad (see 
Bordo 1993,58; Solomon 1982, chaps. 3 and 6). The ultimate effectiveness of 
these measures remains debatable even today. For example, New York banks, 
restricted from lending directly to foreigners, could legally set up London sub- 
sidiaries capable of  taking dollar deposits and making the forbidden loans. 
Non-U.S. banks also competed for this business. Regulations meant to retain 
dollar inflows within U.S. borders therefore shunted these dollars into the Lon- 
don Eurodollar market, promoting that market’s spectacular growth at the ex- 
pense of onshore U.S. banks.44 
The dollar itself came under concerted attack in the early 197Os, a develop- 
ment due in part to President Lyndon Johnson’s escalation of military and do- 
mestic spending, in part to divergent productivity trends. Increasingly volatile 
capital flows set the stage for the ultimate collapse of fixed exchange rates in 
early 1973 (see Solomon 1982, chaps. 11-13;  Yeager 1976, chap. 28). Several 
industrialized countries temporarily floated their currencies prior to the Smith- 
sonian dollar devaluation of December 197 1, and several, including Germany, 
imposed restrictions on  capital inflows (Bakker 1996, 122). When the new 
Smithsonian parities were attacked over 1972 and 1973, Japan, Switzerland, 
Germany, France, and the Netherlands all raised their barriers to capital in- 
flows, including quantitative borrowing restrictions, interest taxes, and supple- 
mental reserve requirements. Concerned by  the disruptive effect of  floating 
intra-European exchange rates on its common agricultural policy and on its 
ongoing drive for further economic integration, the European Community is- 
sued a general derogation from its May  1960 first directive on capital account 
liberalization and went further in directing members to develop or reinstate 
effective mechanisms for controlling capital flows and their effects on domes- 
tic money supplies (Bakker 1996, 116-18). The lira and sterling, like the dollar, 
were under selling pressure; Italy and Britain raised barriers to stem outflows 
as a result. In June 1972 the United Kingdom extended its exchange control 
system to apply to transactions within the Sterling Area and let the pound float 
downward. The pressure of  speculation remained unbearable however. By 
March 1973, industrialized country currencies were floating against the U.S. 
dollar, with six EC currencies floating jointly within a “snake” while Italy and 
the Anglo-Irish currency union floated independently. 
44. Concern about the US.  balance-of-payments deficit was not universal. For a cogent contrary 
position, see Kindleberger (1965). For some skeptical remarks on the importance of the  “confi- 
dence problem’’ posed by an increasing ratio of official dollar liabilities to US.  gold, see Obstfeld 
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11.3.5  The Process of International Financial Integration after 1973 
Bretton Woods proved untenable in the end because its rules could not rec- 
oncile independent national policy goals, pegged exchange rates, and even the 
limited degree of capital mobility implied by  an open world trading system. 
Once industrial countries had been forced to accept floating dollar exchange 
rates as an open-ended interim regime, however, at least some governments 
felt free to liberalize capital movements without sacrificing either their domes- 
tic policy priorities or an external currency commitment. Over the years 1974- 
75, the United States dropped its restrictions on capital outflows while Ger- 
many liberalized inflows. Germany would again deploy controls over inflows 
in the late 1970s, when dollar weakness threatened to enhance the reserve cur- 
rency status of the deutsche mark, a development the Bundesbank has resisted. 
France and  Italy retained and  even tightened  some controls in order to 
loosen the link between monetary and exchange rate policy. A strong motiva- 
tion for these actions was the desire to limit intra-EC exchange rate fluctua- 
tions, first within the informal EC currency snake and later within the Euro- 
pean Monetary System (EMS; Giavazzi and Giovannini 1989; Bakker 1996). 
The United Kingdom also tightened and retained controls until 1979. In that 
year, Thatcherite free market ideology, allied with a fear that North Sea oil 
would bring the “Dutch disease” of sterling appreciation, together led to sus- 
pension of the 1947 Exchange Control Act and full capital account liberaliza- 
tion. Japan largely opened its capital account in December 1980, the culmina- 
tion  of  a  series of  steps beginning in  1974. Liberalization was  typically 
undertaken to promote inflows or outflows that would counter yen depreciation 
or appreciation; only rarely were controls tightened. The liberalizing trend 
seems to have reflected pressures from the domestic business and financial 
communities (It0 1992, 316-21).  Further measures to ease foreign asset ex- 
changes were taken in 1984, partly as a result of U.S. pressure (Frankel 1984; 
Ito 1992, 329). 
Developing countries almost universally retained tight capital account con- 
trols throughout the entire Bretton Woods period, the most important sources 
of  capital inflow being official loans and foreign direct investment (Cardoso 
and Dornbusch 1989). The two oil price shocks of the 1970s produced large 
and persistent surpluses for oil producers but only transitory deficits for the 
industrialized world. The oil surpluses were “recycled” to developing countries 
through industrialized country banks, so that by  the early 1980s developing 
market borrowers owed a substantial debt to the banks, most of it government 
or government guaranteed. Most developing countries retained strict control 
over private exchange transactions. As of 30 April 1980, only 50 of  140 IMF 
members had formally ceased operating under the “temporary” Article XIV 
derogation from Article VIII (Dam 1982, lOl), although these countries ac- 
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Table 11.5  Net Capital Flows to Developing Countries, 1977-94  (bfflion U.S. 
dollars) 
Category of Capital Inflow  1977-82  1983-89  1990-94 
Foreign direct investment  11.2  13.3  39.1 
Other (including bank lending)  29.8  -11.0  22.2 
Portfolio investment  -  10.5  6.5  43.6 
Total  30.5  8.8  104.9 
Source: Folkerts-Landau and Ito (1995, 33). 
The developing country debt buildup turned into a crisis in August 1982 
under the pressure of a global economic downturn and sharply higher world 
interest rates. Bank lenders became unwilling to extend new loans or even roll 
over maturing debts, and generalized default loomed, as in 193  1. Open default 
was avoided through concerted rescheduling orchestrated largely by the United 
States and the IMF. Only toward the end of the 1980s did U.S.-brokered debt 
workouts under the Brady plan begin to pave the way for renewed private lend- 
ing to the developing world, which boomed in the early 1990s. Direct invest- 
ment has grown significantly, but more strikingly, bank lending to governments 
has given way to portfolio investment in bond and equity markets (see table 
11  S).  The shift in the composition of developing country liabilities is in part a 
reflection of wide-ranging financial sector restructuring in these countries. 
In the  mid- 1970s several Latin American  countries, notably Argentina, 
Chile,  and  Uruguay,  opened  their  capital  accounts  as  part  of  exchange- 
rate-based  stabilization programs. These programs, flawed by insufficient fis- 
cal  stringency, inadequate domestic financial supervision, and  inconsistent 
wage indexation structures, all proved to be unsustainable and were followed 
by  renewed capital account restrictions. More recently, numerous developing 
countries in East Asia have instituted domestic financial deregulation and at 
least partial capital account opening, often in the face of  large external sur- 
pluses. Similar developments followed in Latin America against a background 
of serious fiscal reform, aggressive privatization, and successful inflation stabi- 
li~ation.~~  These reform efforts encouraged renewed capital inflows, although 
the decline in U.S.  interest rates in the early  1990s is clearly an important 
additional causal factor. 'ho  closely interrelated issues of debate, as yet unre- 
solved, are the appropriate degree and form of  exchange rate flexibility and 
capital account control for these countries. 
The durability of the developing world's return to the global capital market 
remains to be seen. Investor interest weakened when U.S. interest rates rose in 
1994, and several industrializing countries faced pressure in the aftermath of 
45. Edwards (1995, chap. 3) analyzes the forces behind the recent trend of economic liberaliza- 
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the 1994-95  Mexican crisis. Markets have so far displayed greater resilience 
than in 1982; even Mexico has been able to borrow again, albeit with the aid 
of extraordinary financial backing from the U.S. Treasury and the IME 
Perhaps the most dramatic move toward full capital account liberalization 
occurred among the continental members of the European Union. Starting 
in the  1980s, these countries began  moving toward the goal of  free intra- 
European capital mobility foreshadowed in the Treaty of  Rome-which  in 
practice implied unrestricted mobility vis-a-vis the outside world as well, given 
Germany’s commitment to openness and the difficulty in any case of enforcing 
partial restrictions. France joined the trend after 1983, when President Frangois 
Mitterrand abandoned his socialist growth agenda in favor of the franc’s contin- 
ued participation in the EMS exchange rate mechanism. Germany has consis- 
tently pushed its European partners toward capital account freedom, except 
while Bretton Woods was unraveling in the early 1970s. An important motive 
for this advocacy has been the belief that an open capital account would im- 
pose discipline over monetary and fiscal policies. Germany’s capital account 
was completely open by  1981; that of  the Netherlands by  1986; Denmark’s 
by  1989; Belgium-Luxembourg’s and Italy’s by  1990; Spain’s, Portugal’s, and 
Ireland‘s by  1992; and Greece’s by 1994 (Bakker 1996,220). Austria, Sweden, 
and Finland, which joined the European Union in 1995, also had open capital 
accounts of fairly long standing by that time. 
Driving this broad liberalization was an  acceleration in both  commodity 
market integration within Europe and in plans for monetary union. The EMS 
currency crisis of the years 1992-93  illustrated once again the untenability of 
fixed exchange parities when capital is mobile and domestic economic condi- 
tions assume primacy over the exchange rate. However, calls to reinstate capital 
controls after the crises of the early 1990s have so far been rejected, and the 
European Union remains committed by  treaty to full monetary and financial 
integration for a subset of  members by  1 January 1999. If  that momentous 
event comes to pass, even on the limited basis of  a small core of  countries 
including France and Germany, the utopian goal of European economic union 
first espoused by  the United States in the late  1940s will be  substantially 
achieved. Inevitably, that goal appears to coexist uneasily with internal politi- 
cal realities. Indeed, the late-1990s drive by EU governments to meet the Maas- 
tricht macroeconomic convergence criteria has allowed a considerable degree 
of  exchange stability, but at the cost of  rising unemployment. These recent 
developments are uncomfortably reminiscent of the coordinated global macro- 
policy contraction that brought on the Great Depression. Happily, most of the 
world is not participating this time. 
11.4  Summary 
This paper has chronicled both the decline of the international capital mar- 
ket during the Great Depression and its gradual regeneration over the period 397  International Capital Mobility over the Long Run 
since the Second World War. A major unifying theme in that story has been 
the basic incompatibility of open capital markets with a regime that aims to 
attain both exchange rate stability and domestic employment or growth objec- 
tives. Under the gold standard before 1914, exchange stability was the overrid- 
ing goal of monetary policy and domestic objectives took a back seat. Thus, 
the monetary regime was  consistent with considerable international capital 
mobility. The Great Depression discredited gold standard orthodoxy, propelled 
Keynesian economics to intellectual ascendancy,  and, worldwide, solidified the 
already vocal political constituencies favoring high employment and govem- 
ment intervention over laissez-faire. The result was  a postwar international 
monetary system based on capital account restrictions and pegged but adjust- 
able exchange rates, one whose very success ultimately led to increasingly 
unmanageable speculative flows and floating dollar exchange rates among the 
industrialized economies. Floating rates, in turn, have allowed the industrial- 
ized countries to deregulate capital flows extensively while pursuing domestic 
macrogoals. In the European Union, where capital mobility is free, the tension 
between domestic political imperatives and the supranational  goal of monetary 
union remains apparent only a year before the 1 January 1999 deadline for a 
single EU currency laid down by  the Maastricht Treaty.  In  the developing 
world, there is continuing experimentation and debate over the optimal point 
on the trade-off among currency stability, freedom of capital movements, and 
other economic goals. 
Domestic financial deregulation,  like capital account decontrol, also acceler- 
ated in the 1970s. In part, that development flows from the trend toward freer 
international financial trade. After the 1950s, countries increasingly allowed 
homegrown financial institutions to compete for international business within 
enclaves separated from domestic markets by a strict cordon sanitaire.  As resi- 
dent capital controls were lifted, however, domestic deregulation became a 
competitive  necessity. Domestic deregulation  and the consequent growth of the 
financial sector, in turn, have made it much harder to reimpose capital account 
restrictions effectively today.  The potential threat to systemic stability that 
competitive financial deregulation poses has motivated the Basle Committee’s 
work since 1974 on supervisory collaboration among nations. 
At the start of  the Great Depression the United States was the dominant 
economic power in  world markets but had no appetite for a commensurate 
political leadership role. Even before World War I1 had ended, the U.S. govern- 
ment recognized America’s natural position of  leadership and implemented 
several strategies to further a vision of a cooperative  postwar international eco- 
nomic order. In the 1990s major components of that vision have largely been 
realized, though not within a policy regime the American postwar planners 
would recognize or, most probably, endorse. While the current system is not 
free of  shortcomings, it has allowed sovereign nations to coexist and, where 
they have liberalized and opened their economies, to begin converging. More- 
over, a replay of the Great Depression has been avoided so far. It is ironic that 398  Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor 
the current international system sprung directly from one based on disillusion 
with the interwar performance of free capital mobility and floating exchange 
rates alike. Thus Keynes’s remark in closing the Bretton Woods conference 
may still be appropriate: “How much better that our projects should begin in 
disillusion than that they should end in it!” (1980b, 103). 
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